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THE POLARIZATION OF REPRODUCTIVE AND 
PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
JAMIE R. ABRAMS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Women’s abortion and parental decision-making in child rearing are constructed as polar-
ized methods of decision-making in law, politics, and society. Women’s abortion decision-making 
is understood as myopic and individualistic. Parental decision-making is understood as sacrifi-
cial and selfless. This polarization leaves reproductive decision-making isolated, marginalized, 
and vulnerable while parental decision-making is essentialized, protected, and revered. Both 
framings are inaccurate and problematic. A unified family decision-making framework that 
aligns abortion decision-making and parental decision-making reveals that both forms of deci-
sion-making are more multi-dimensional, relational, and family-centered than currently under-
stood. This Article exposes the ground to be gained by crossing longstanding boundaries in fami-
ly law and reproductive rights to more accurately and inclusively frame decision-making. This is 
a critical step to pull abortion decision-making from its marginalized periphery and reposition it 
as complex, imperfect, family-focused, and central to family law.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Article reveals worrisome inaccuracies in how we understand 
and frame abortion decision-making. It particularly reveals a prob-
lematic polarization in how abortion decision-making is framed com-
pared to parental decision-making, a polarization distinguished be-
tween “autono(me)” and “autono(thee)” decision-making. It concludes 
that autono(me) is the troublesome framework by which a woman is 
inaccurately perceived to universally make abortion decisions exclu-
sively in a myopic lens, focused only on her own needs or wants. 
However, strong data exists supporting that a women’s actual deci-
sion-making lens often focuses squarely on existing children. This 
framing ignores how women make reproductive decisions in an au-
tono(thee) and, more often, in an autono(we) lens. Autono(thee), in 
contrast, is the troublesome framework by which the law wrongly 
pretends that parents exclusively make decisions in a myopic lens 
focused only on the Best Interests of the Child (BIOC). This framing 
ignores the ways in which parents can also make decisions in an au-
tono(me) and, more often, in an autono(we) lens. This polarized fram-
ing marginalizes women’s abortion decision-making as anomalously 
self-centered, callous, and gendered when compared to the ordinary 
decision-making framework of parents.1  
 A unified decision-making framework grounded in family law 
would yield a more accurate, inclusive, destigmatized framing.2 Pro-
posing a unified framework to understand and describe parental and 
abortion decision-making disrupts longstanding boundaries in repro-
ductive politics and core organizing principles of family law.3 It is vir-
tually unprecedented within reproductive rights scholarship or advo-
cacy to speak of reproductive rights in the same conversation as “par-
ents” or “children.”4 This is for fear that such categorizations would 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. 
REV. 409, 439 (2013) (arguing that “abortion disgust” derives from “women engaging in 
gender-atypical behavior”). 
 2. Importantly, as discussed more thoroughly below, the question of abortion 
decision-making can be tethered to family law regardless of one’s political perspective on 
abortion. While this Article is candidly written from the perspective of advancing the 
reproductive rights movement, this Article targets the methodology of how decision-making 
is framed in law and society more than the substance of the decision itself.  
 3. See, e.g., KATHLEEN MCDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHOICE: A FEMINIST RE-
EXAMINES ABORTION 21 (1984) (observing, over thirty years ago, that the “feminist 
discourse on abortion has changed little” (emphasis added)). While feminist theory has 
done great work to expand, develop, and mature in the areas of violence, for example, it 
has remained more static on the issue of abortion. Id. at 22-23.  
 4. See Rachel K. Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like, Everything in the 
World”: How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who Have Abortions, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 
79, 79-80 (2008) (“In the prevailing discourse on abortion in the United States, abortion and 
motherhood are often regarded as opposing interests, and it is typically assumed that women 
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subject women as reproductive decision-makers to the same obliga-
tions and state oversight that parents have. This Article does not 
seek to apply parental standards or obligations to a woman’s decision 
to terminate a pregnancy, but it seeks to comparatively analyze how 
both types of decisions are made to debunk myths and to destigma-
tize abortion decision-making.5  
 Part II sets out the polarized framings that currently dominate 
and divide abortion decision-making and parental decision-making. 
Part III explains the ways in which these framings are inaccurate 
and problematic and makes the case for a unified framing of family 
decision-making. This framing inclusively acknowledges that both 
parental decision-making and abortion decision-making have aspects 
of autono(me), autono(thee), and autono(we) lenses. Part IV explains 
why this approach is needed and how a revised strategic framing 
would build bridges instead of walls, and strengthen credibility and 
inclusivity in the reproductive rights movement.6  
II.   THE POLARIZATION OF AUTONO(ME) AND AUTONO(THEE) 
 Women’s abortion decision-making and parental decision-making in 
child-rearing are constructed as polarized processes. Women’s abortion 
decision-making is understood as myopic and individualistic, and pa-
rental decision-making is understood as sacrificial and selfless. This 
polarization leaves reproductive decision-making isolated, marginal-
ized, and vulnerable while parental decision-making is essentialized 
and revered. Both framings are inaccurate and problematic.  
A.   The Marginalized Autono(me) Framing of Women’s  
Abortion Decision-Making  
 The autono(me) framing largely dominates legal, political, and 
social discourses of women’s abortion decision-making. The language 
of “autono(me)” depicts how “autonomy” legal framings are overlaid 
with problematic connotations and perceptions suggesting that this 
decision-making is myopic and individualistic.  
                                                                                                                                 
who obtain abortions do not want to be mothers, at least not at the time of the abortion, 
because they are unable or unwilling to assume the responsibilities of raising a child.”). 
 5. See generally Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?: Gonzales v. Carhart and 
the Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 14 (2008) (“One 
of the problems we will face in explaining women’s decision-making, though, is the lack of 
information people have about the process and the assumptions that grow in that void, 
assumptions fueled by the anti-abortion movement’s widespread and well-funded 
disinformation campaigns.”).  
 6. See, e.g., Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 327, 327-35 (2013) (examining the development and interconnections among 
reproductive health, reproductive rights, and reproductive justice movements).  
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 The “pro-choice” movement has worked to frame and protect a 
woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Advocates his-
torically were driven to respond to the “pro-life” framing with an ac-
cessible, understandable framing, and the “right to choose” pre-
vailed.7 This language of choice was a critical historic pivot from the 
early efforts to frame abortion as an issue of public health—a fram-
ing that activists have staunchly sought to return to in modern 
times.8 This language of “choice” versus “life” has critically “co-opted 
the hard fact that” a woman may terminate a pregnancy to save her 
own life.9 This language of choice was then enshrined in Roe v. 
Wade.10 This language explains the legal roots of the right, but it 
oversimplifies and essentializes how the decisions are made. It is too 
narrow of a frame.11 This framing has had critical “staying power” 
over several decades, a point that legal historian Mary Ziegler argues 
merits a “fuller account.”12 This Article seeks to expand that account 
as to the decision-making it depicts.  
                                                                                                                                 
 7. LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT 
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 33-34 (2012) 
(providing the historic documentation of Jimmye Kimmey offering the options of “Freedom 
of Conscience” and “Right to Choose”). 
 8. See id. at ix (explaining how the claims for liberalizing abortion law “in the name 
of public health gave way over time to claims of the women’s movement seeking for women 
liberty, equality, and dignity: women’s right to control their own bodies and lives; to have 
their voices and decisions treated with respect; and to participate as equals in private and 
public life”); see, e.g., About Us, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., http://www.reproductiverights.org/ 
about-us [https://perma.cc/C7JQ-JGRY] (helping women realize their “right to reproductive 
health and autonomy” and fighting globally to advance women’s reproductive health, 
self-determination, and dignity as basic human rights); PLANNED PARENTHOOD ACTION 
FUND, https://secure.ppaction.org/ (last visited August 22, 2016) (emphasizing its work 
on reproductive health).  
 9. Nicole Huberfeld, With Liberty and Access for Some: The ACA’s Disconnect for 
Women’s Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1361 (2013) (noting that prohibiting access 
to abortions thus can threaten the life of pregnant women too). 
 10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING 
ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 117 (1990) (“[T]he vocabularies of 
both Life and Choice became partially entrenched in the law, although in different ways 
and covering different territories.”).  
 11. See Reproductive Justice Media Reference Guide, FORWARD TOGETHER, 
https://forwardtogether.org/tools/media-guide-abortion-latinx-community/ (last visited Feb. 
22, 2017) (explaining how mainstream media coverage focuses narrowly on a “single 
‘choice’ framework” that has “limited the media coverage of many other reproductive rights 
and health issues”). See generally Luna & Luker, supra note 6, at 328 (highlighting how 
the reproductive justice movement “called for recognition of the limitations of emphasizing 
choice, which had largely come to mean the choice to have an abortion”).  
 12. MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 232 
(2015). For example, Ziegler explores: “Has the choice framework varied in influence, or 
have supporters of legal abortion challenged, reshaped, and revived it? What can abortion-
rights activists do, if anything, to move away from this approach? Like single-issue politics, 
the idea of a right to choose has a long and complicated history.” Id. at 232-33. 
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 This framing has perpetuated misperceptions of how women make 
abortion decisions. Consider as a starting point all of the problematic 
ways in which abortion decision-making is framed solely around au-
tono(me) in the following quote:  
A woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy is both empowering 
and liberating. It empowers her because her choice acknowledges 
that she understands her options, her current situation, and her 
future expectations, and she is able to make a fully informed deci-
sion about what would most benefit her and act on it. It liberates 
her because she can regain control of her reproductive system and 
chart her destiny without an unwanted child in tow. It liberates 
her to fully care for her existing family, her career, her emotional 
and mental well-being, and her goals.13 
This quote uses “her” or “she” seventeen times to refer to the deci-
sion! It positions the pregnant woman as a mirror, and her decision-
making methodology only focuses on herself and her needs. In con-
trast, as explored more below, parental decision-making is positioned 
as an external scope in which parents look out at their children. 
While this account may explain some abortion decision-making, it is 
not a universal or fully descriptive account, yet it dominates main-
stream political, legal, and social framings.  
 This autono(me) framing is perpetuated, for example, in laws gov-
erning minor’s access to abortion bypassing parental consent. While 
the exact standards applied to minors seeking a judicial bypass of 
parental consent vary from state to state, fifteen states use a BIOC 
standard to focus exclusively on whether a judicial bypass is in the 
interest of the minor.14 This considers explicitly whether the abortion 
is in the minor’s best interests. This perpetuates the idea that girls 
are making this decision in an exclusively individualistic manner, 
without the context of family, community, and existing children.  
 This autono(me) framing can be used to troublesome legal and po-
litical ends. It distorts the methodology of abortion decision-making 
by stripping it of any perspectives of the needs of others or the inter-
connected relationships involved. A South Carolina court of appeals 
decision reveals the harsh consequences of an exclusive (and even 
derogatory) autono(me) frame. In Purser v. Owens, the family court 
                                                                                                                                 
 13. Henry Morgentaler, Abortion Is a Moral Choice, in THE ETHICS OF ABORTION 13, 
21 (Jennifer A. Hurley ed., 2001) (emphasis added).  
 14. Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions 
[https://perma.cc/HKT8-FMCB]. All states provide a mechanism for a minor bypass. Some 
states particularly instruct judges to use the BIOC standard to grant this relief. Satsie 
Veith, The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents’ Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the 
“Maturity” Standard, HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 453 (1994).  
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considered a custody dispute between the mother and father of an 
autistic child.15 The couple had never married.16 The father had ir-
regular contact with the child and paid child support voluntarily for 
the first several years of his son’s life, but after a remarriage, he be-
gan more consistent contact in 2005.17 The mother was the child’s 
primary caretaker for his entire life, including extensive speech and 
occupational therapy.18 In 2006, the mother became pregnant with 
her current boyfriend and elected to terminate the pregnancy.19 She 
testified that the abortion was because the second child had a 50% 
chance of also having autism and “she felt a second child would take 
away her focus from [the existing] [c]hild, and [her] [b]oyfriend was 
not someone she wanted involved in her and [the existing] [c]hild’s 
lives anymore.”20 The family court awarded custody to the father, de-
spite findings that the mother was fit and the primary caretaker.21 
The court explicitly expressed concern with the pregnancy and abor-
tion: “That was an irresponsible decision; two irresponsible decisions. 
First being involved with a 19 year old when you are 36 or 35. That’s 
irresponsible. And then having an abortion. That’s irresponsible. I 
am concerned about the environment.”22  
 Here, the mother paid a steep cost for an autono(me) lens, as the 
court perceived it. Because she had made what the judge perceived to 
be “irresponsible” decisions, she lost custody of her child. When the 
trial court saw her decision in a demonized autono(me) frame, it saw 
it also as fundamentally inconsistent with parenting decision-
making, without regard to how she had actually cared for and raised 
her child who was the subject of the litigation. 
 The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the family court 
erred in considering the mother’s abortion.23 Rather, her decision 
“had no direct or indirect effect on [the existing] [c]hild and therefore 
was not relevant to the custody determination.”24 The court of ap-
peals remanded for consideration excluding this evidence.25 It re-
framed the mother’s decision as one focused on the well-being of her 
existing child and acting in his best interests. The court of appeals, 
                                                                                                                                 
 15. Purser v. Owens, 722 S.E.2d 225, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 16. Id. at 225. 
 17. Id. at 225-26. 
 18. Id. at 226. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 227. 
 23. Id. at 228. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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thus, reframed her decision around what the next Section will de-
scribe as an autono(thee) lens. This autono(thee) and/or autono(we) 
lens considered her existing child’s needs, the impact that a second 
autistic child would have on her first child, and the role of the second 
child’s father in their lives.  
 As Purser’s family court opinion reveals, this exclusive autono(me) 
framing can be misperceived and distorted. It can create an inaccu-
rate framing of women’s abortion decision-making as narrowly fo-
cused on themselves in the abstract. The “right-to-life” movement has 
seized on this framing and pushed forward descriptions of abortion 
decision-making as driven by “convenience” and “self-development.”26 
The marginalization and demonization of an exclusive autono(me) 
framework are perhaps well reflected in Pope Francis’s recent re-
marks stating that the decision not to have children is a “selfish 
choice.”27 The “Silent No More” movement has likewise leveraged this 
frame of abortion as an inherently selfish act and urged women to 
come forward and explain it as such.28 And accordingly, this political 
framing has yielded notable political traction in which many Ameri-
cans do disapprove of abortion for the self-development (e.g., career 
or schooling) of the pregnant woman.29  
 Critically, this individual autonomy framing contrasts with other 
approaches, such as the legal rules governing abortion in England. 
The 1967 Abortion Act, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act of 1990, makes abortion legal up to twenty-four 
weeks under certain circumstances.30 Those circumstances include 
when two doctors agree in good faith that “continuance of the preg-
nancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were termi-
nated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman or any existing children of her family.”31 The statute further 
                                                                                                                                 
 26. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1559, 1578 (1991). 
 27. David Gibson, Pope Francis: ‘Not to Have Children Is a Selfish Choice,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/12/ 
pope-francis-children_n_6671464.html [https://perma.cc/Z95F-528X] (“Life rejuvenates and 
acquires energy when it multiplies: It is enriched, not impoverished!” (quoting Pope Francis)).  
 28. Why We Chose Abortion: Susan and Hrach Share Their Story, SILENT NO MORE, 
http://www.silentnomoreawareness.org/testimonies/testimony5235.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
6UVV-SGG3] (quoting one narrative that the reason a woman had three abortions was “I 
selfishly wanted my career, educational plans and my relationships to remain unchanged,” 
and another husband explaining that “[t]he reason I encouraged her was selfishness. I 
wanted our new marriage to get off the ground without being hindered in any way. I also 
did not want our professional and travel plans to be steered off course.”).  
 29. Williams, supra note 26, at 1583. 
 30. Abortion Act 1967, in FRANCES BURTON, CORE STATUTES ON FAMILY LAW, 25 
(2016-2017). 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
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allows that when determining the risks, “account may be taken of the 
pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.”32 
Under this model, there is arguably no individual autonomy at all be-
cause the doctors make the ultimate decision. This framing is subject 
to its own critiques, including that it arguably positions women as ei-
ther “too selfish or too irrational to be left to make her own decision,” 
and that it still positions maternity as the norm for women and abor-
tion as the exception.33 It does, however, position abortion decision-
making as a decision to be understood in a contextual family frame.  
 The exclusive autono(me) frame positions women—and only wom-
en—to have to defend their decisions from dominant hierarchies, re-
quiring women’s decision-making to be uniquely selfless and sacrifi-
cial.34 Gonzales v. Carhart particularly revealed how demonized an 
autono(me) frame can become and how it can be contrasted starkly 
with women’s roles as “natural” caregivers.35 Gonzales challenged the 
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Act.36 It revealed that 
the Court still understood the woman’s right to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy as a decision that occurred in consultation with her 
doctor.37 The Court’s rhetorical language revealed its view that “doc-
tors” protect fetal interests, “abortion doctors” protect women’s au-
tonomy, that women are naturally destined as mothers, and women 
who seek to terminate a pregnancy need to be protected.38 It suggests 
that abortion is not healthcare and that women need to be “protected 
from providers” who might fail to inform or guide them properly in 
their decision.39 This is a distinctly “woman-protective argument.”40 
The Court suggested that it was not just that women need to be pro-
tected from poor decision-making; it is that women who seek to exer-
                                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. Sally Sheldon, The Abortion Act 1967: A Critical Perspective, in ABORTION LAW 
AND POLITICS TODAY 43, 49 (Ellie Lee ed., 1998).  
 34. See CONDIT, supra note 10, at 180 (“As American society and public discourse 
have been constituted, women must justify their own moral principles as they apply them 
because these principles and the female interests they represent have not become publicly 
accepted maxims. . . . [leaving women to] then negotiate between ‘their’ principles and the 
dominant principles.”).  
 35. 550 U.S. 124, 125 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 124. 
 37. See generally id. 
 38. See id. at 159-60 (“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the 
course of their medical practice, nor should it elevate their status above other physicians in 
the medical community.”)  
 39. Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion 
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 405 (2013) (explaining how Gonzales and Casey have posi-
tioned “abortion exclusively as a right of choice, uncoupled from healthcare” (citing Gonza-
les, 550 U.S. 124, and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992)).  
 40. Id. at 410. 
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cise their decision-making autonomy in any way other than with a 
fetal focus are in need of protective barriers. It is a false choice for 
women: either act to protect fetal life, or the state needs to protect 
you from your decision-making.41 
 This Article critiques the essentialized view that all women make 
decisions using one particular lens. While some women do make re-
productive decisions in an autono(me) lens, it is important that the 
law acknowledge that not all women or all decisions sit in this frame 
or in any one frame alone.42 This conclusion is explored more fully in 
the Section below. 
B.   The Dominant Autono(thee) Framing of  
Parental Decision-Making 
 In stark contrast, the BIOC legal standard perpetuates an essen-
tialized inaccuracy that parents act myopically in the best interests of 
their children. It is not just that this narrative exists, but that it is 
revered and accepted as universal. This, in turn, perpetuates the myth 
that parents always subordinate their interests to their children. A 
narrative suggesting that parental rights have been subordinated to 
children’s interests dominates family law, but it is not fully accurate or 
descriptive.43 This Section explores the legal standard and the false 
premise that it explains parental decision-making universally. 
1.   The BIOC Standard  
 The BIOC standard perpetuates a view that is squarely focused on 
the children’s interests—in stark contrast to the individual rights of 
the parents. This view may be generally accurate in describing state 
interventions, but even then, it is not consistently accurate, and it is 
not accurate for all parental decision-making. The BIOC standard is 
                                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. (“[T]he woman-protective argument conflates healthcare and choice: A woman 
must be protected from the abortion decision because the choice is harmful to her physical 
and mental health.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Kate Cockrill & Tracy A. Weitz, Abortion Patients’ Perceptions of Abortion 
Regulation, 20 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 12, 14 (2010) (“The reasons for choosing abortion 
among the women in our sample were diverse, but for most they matched the general 
categories identified in recent research ‘that having a child would interfere with a woman’s 
education, work or ability to care for dependents; that she could not afford a baby now; and 
that she did not want to be a single mother or was having relationship problems.’ ”). Consider, 
for example, a woman who terminates her pregnancy to save her own life. These women do 
not feel that they have exercised their autonomy or made a choice at all. See MCDONNELL, 
supra note 3, at 35. 
 43. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 133 (2014). 
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consistently extended to many different family law settings, includ-
ing custody and visitation.44  
 The BIOC standard is the “touchstone” underlying custody law in 
the United States and globally.45 The history of custody law is, at bot-
tom, a debate about whose rights—children, parents, moms, or dads—
should be given “paramount consideration.”46 It is generally under-
stood to have “at least as many weaknesses as it does strengths.”47 
 Custody law has changed dramatically throughout history from a 
property interest to a fundamental constitutional right, and from a 
gendered to a gender-neutral standard.48 The BIOC standard dis-
tinctly emerged as the touchstone of family law, hallmarked by the 
release of the 1970 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act’s BIOC fac-
tors.49 The gender-neutral BIOC standard replaced the earlier eras of 
gendered presumptions.50 
                                                                                                                                 
 44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 752.011 (2016) (applying the BIOC standard to grandparent 
visitation); R.S. v. J.S., 457 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing the Missouri statute 
requiring the court to consider the BIOC when modifying a prior custody decree); Brian Bix, 
Best Interests of the Child 2 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 08-08, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092544. 
See generally Lahny R. Silva, The Best Interest Is the Child: A Historical Philosophy for 
Modern Issues, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 415 (2014) (arguing that the BIOC standard should be 
reframed and applied even beyond family law to the juvenile justice system).  
 45. Caroline Simon, The ‘Best Interests of the Child’ in a Multicultural Context: A 
Case Study, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 175, 180 (2015) (“The notion of the 
BIC is today one of the most often mobilised concepts in national and international chil-
dren’s rights and family law.”).  
 46. Erin Bajackson, Note, Best Interests of the Child—A Legislative Journey Still in 
Motion, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 311, 311-12 (2013) (noting that this question has 
“sparked a firestorm of legislation”).  
 47. See id. at 311 (summarizing that “[a]t best it can be described as a fact-driven pro-
cess that most accurately protects a child’s physical, psychological, and emotional needs [and 
a]t worst it has been deemed an egocentric, utilitarian product of the state’s design to make 
children productive members of society rather than burdens upon it later in life,” ultimately 
concluding that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes (footnotes omitted)).  
 48. Custody was presumptively given to fathers, historically aligning with 
understandings of children as property and the lack of legal identity of women. Linda D. 
Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The 
Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 390-91 (2008). In time, this 
presumption shifted to a gendered presumption that women were more appropriate 
caretakers of children of young ages. Id. at 391. This maternal presumption was entirely 
gone by the 1970s. Id. This presumption was particularly applied for children of “tender 
years,” often considered to be children under seven years old. Kelly Schwartz, Note, The 
Kids Are Not All Right: Using the Best Interest Standard to Prevent Parental Alienation 
and a Therapeutic Intervention Approach to Provide Relief, 56 B.C. L. REV. 803, 815-16 
(2015). Fathers, however, were still presumed to be the presumptive best custodians of 
children beyond their formative years. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 314 (noting that these 
presumptions could be overcome with factual findings of unfitness).  
 49. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 314-15 (explaining that factors contributing to the shift 
to female favoritism include “the industrial revolution, the women’s rights movement, and 
changes in the field of psychology” (quoting Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, A Custody System 
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 The BIOC standard directs judges to focus squarely on the per-
spective of the children.51 While the exact factors vary from state to 
state, the core factors allow states to consider the wishes of the 
child’s parents; the wishes of the child; the interaction and interrela-
tionship of the child with parents, siblings, and any other persons 
who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; and the mental 
and physical health of all parties.52 No one factor is considered dis-
positive in identifying the child’s best interests.53 Typically, the only 
evidence that is not admissible in determining the BIOC is evidence 
that does not have a nexus to the child, such as the sexual activity of 
a parent that does not impact the child.54 Courts deploy experts and 
consider a broad range of factors that are all narrowly focused on an-
swering the “central concern” of the child’s best interests.55 In a 
                                                                                                                                 
Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions 
for a More Protective and Equitable Custody System, 88 KY. L.J. 761, 768 (2000))). 
 50. Elrod & Dale, supra note 48, at 392 (“The impact of child custody law’s paradigm shift 
to the gender-neutral best interests of the child standard in the 1970s almost defies descrip-
tion. Rather than basing custody decisions on gender- or status-based presumptions, judges 
were suddenly charged with making individualized determinations without presumptions or a 
clear default position.”). But see Bajackson, supra note 46, at 312-15 (noting that some men 
and men’s rights groups argue that gender neutrality has not been achieved and that the ma-
ternal presumption still influences courts); Elizabeth Gresk, Opposing Viewpoints: Best Inter-
ests of the Child vs. the Fathers’ Rights Movement, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 390, 391 (2013) 
(“[T]he tender years doctrine sill influences decisions made in family courts. . . . [M]others are 
overwhelmingly favored as primary custodians for children.”). 
 51. Bix, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that this emphasis is distinctly not focused on the 
“claims and interests of other parties,” such as the parents).  
 52. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5328 (2016). The inclusion of the children’s wishes 
in the custody decision-making framework marked a historic development in custody law 
away from children as property to children as autonomous beings. Bajackson, supra note 
46, at 317 (“This factor [reflects] an important leap forward from the presumption periods 
defining a child’s worth as a piece of owned property to a more even playing field that puts 
children’s rights more in line with those enjoyed by their parents.”).  
 53. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17(b)(1) (2016) (“The court may not use one factor to 
the exclusion of all others, and the court shall consider that the factors may be 
interrelated.”). “The court may not focus on a single factor to the exclusion of all others. ‘In 
the search for an appropriate custodial placement, the primary focus of the court is the best 
interests of the child, the child’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and 
in the continuity and stability of its environment.’ ” Gilbert v. Gilbert, No. 093459, 1996 
WL 494080, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1996) (quoting Cappetta v. Cappetta, 490 A.2d 
996, 999 (Conn. 1985)). 
 54. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 315-22 (explaining that the court should not consider 
the conduct of a custodian that does not affect his relationship with the child). See general-
ly MINN. STAT. § 518.17(b)(3) (“In assessing whether parents are capable of sustaining 
nurturing relationships with their children, the court shall recognize that there are many 
ways that parents can respond to a child’s needs with sensitivity and provide the child love 
and guidance, and these may differ between parents and among cultures.”).  
 55. See, e.g., Landwehr v. Landwehr, 442 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“The 
best interest of the child is not merely an important consideration in modification proceed-
ings . . . it is the trial court’s central concern.” (quoting Soehlke v. Soehlke, 398 S.W.3d 10, 
15 (Mo. 2013))). 
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sense, the standard thus functions more like a process or decision-
making methodology than a definition.56 
 Given its breadth and fact-specific nature,57 implementation has 
proven more difficult and indeterminate. The standard relies heavily 
on trial court findings of fact to which appellate courts give great def-
erence.58 The standard positions judges to make BIOC determina-
tions. Accordingly, critics argue that the standard can often hide ju-
dicial bias and promote “arbitrary and inconsistent decision-
making.”59 This oft-cited quote summarizes the challenges:  
Finding the best interests of the child is an attractive public policy 
and a lofty objective, but it is a difficult operational standard. 
When compared to the legal presumptions it replaced, the best in-
terests standard has been assailed as indeterminate and unpre-
dictable. Judges, without the requisite training in child develop-
ment and adequate resources to fully investigate these intensely 
fact-sensitive cases, tend to rely on their own values.60 
Some criticize whether judges are actually prioritizing the children’s 
best interests. Others suggest that the standard is applied in a way 
that privileges women and harms men; conversely, some suggest the 
standard is applied in a way that harshly judges and punishes moth-
ers, while applying disproportionately lenient standards for fathers.61 
                                                                                                                                 
 56. Simon, supra note 45, at 180 (summarizing Belgian family justice and noting that 
“no one can legitimately claim to know a priori what is in the child’s best interests”). 
 57. See, e.g., Noland-Vance v. Vance, 321 S.W.3d 398, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“There 
is no absolute set of rules to follow when awarding child custody; each case must be 
examined in light of its own set of unique facts.” (quoting In re Marriage of Barton, 158 
S.W.3d 879, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005))).  
 58. See, e.g., R.S. v. J.S., 457 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that the 
appellate court must give “great deference” to the trial court’s determination); Noland-
Vance, 321 S.W.3d at 403 (“Because a trial court is vested with considerable discretion in 
determining custody questions, an appellate court should not overturn the trial court’s 
findings unless they are manifestly erroneous and the child’s welfare compels a different 
result. . . . ‘We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court so long as credible 
evidence supports the trial court’s beliefs.’ ” (citations omitted)). “Greater deference is given 
to a trial court’s decision in matters involving child custody than in any other type of case.” 
Id. (explaining that this is because of the trial court’s unique ability to “assess the credibil-
ity of the witnesses, along with their character, sincerity, and other intangibles not com-
pletely revealed by the record”).  
 59. Bix, supra note 44, at 2; see also June Carbone, Legal Applications of the “Best 
Interest of the Child” Standard: Judicial Rationalization or a Measure of Institutional 
Competence?, 134 PEDIATRICS S111, S117 (2014) (“Moreover, however easy it is to posit 
cases in which the courts and other third parties should intervene to protect children’s 
interests, it is equally possible to point to other cases in which such interventions reflect 
judicial bias.”).  
 60. Elrod & Dale, supra note 48, at 392-93 (footnotes omitted). 
 61. See HASDAY, supra note 43, at 141. 
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 Criticisms and obstacles notwithstanding, the BIOC standard 
applies throughout the world62 and has been embedded in interna-
tional human rights documents.63 It holds great longevity, breadth, 
and acceptance. 
2.   The Premise of Autono(thee) Parental Decision-Making 
 The BIOC standard is not just relevant to state interventions. 
The Supreme Court has further concluded that this standard, as 
implemented in the United States, is premised on the conclusion 
that parents—like the state—make decisions focused on their chil-
dren’s best interests.  
 Troxel v. Granville64 reveals this premise of parental decision-
making in the BIOC.65 In Troxel, Tommie Granville sought to limit 
and restrict the visitation terms and conditions of Jennifer and Gary 
Troxel, the parents of the children’s deceased biological father, Brad 
Troxel.66 The children’s grandparents wanted greater visitation, clos-
er to the visitation terms that the children’s father had before his su-
icide.67 The trial court made factual findings relating to the mother’s 
wish to establish a unified, blended family with the children she had 
with Brad Troxel, her children from a prior marriage, her child in her 
current marriage, and the children of her current husband. This re-
quired extensive coordination and effort.68 Tommie’s reasons for lim-
iting the Troxel’s visitation were very much grounded in the chil-
                                                                                                                                 
 62. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 
1989, 1557 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC] (applying the 
best interests of the child standard as the primary standard). See generally KAREN WELLS, 
CHILDHOOD IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 15-21 (2d ed. 2015) (highlighting the emergence of 
international law frameworks for regulating the protection of children).  
 63. CRC, supra note 62, art. 3 (“In all actions concerning children, whether under-
taken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative au-
thorities, or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary considera-
tion.”); Bajackson, supra note 46, at 351; Jason M. Pobjoy, The Best Interests of the Child 
Principle as an Independent Source of International Protection, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
327, 328 (2015) (explaining that the BIOC standard embodied in the CRC is “playing an 
increasingly significant role in decisions involving the admission or removal of a child 
from a host State”).  
 64. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 65. Ariela R. Dubler, Constructing the Modern American Family: The Stories of 
Troxel v. Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, 108 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008) (“[Justice 
O’Connor] frames this story as a rather ordinary tale of family disagreement . . . .”).  
 66. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Dubler, supra note 65, at 103 (“Indeed, through Tommie’s testimony, the 
complicated logistics of the Wynn family emerged in full: Ryan and Kevin Wynn were with 
Tommie and Kelly every other weekend; Jessie and Hallie Granville were with them every 
Saturday through Wednesday; Roth Granville was with them every Tuesday . . . ; and, of 
course, Riley always lived with them.”). This family composition left “twelve adults who 
considered themselves grandparents to the children.” Id.  
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dren’s needs, but also family unity and straightforward parenting 
logistics. The trial court judge wrongly viewed the dispute as one be-
tween the biological mom and the grandparents, with each positioned 
equally in their respective interests.69 The trial judge ruled that it 
was in the BIOC to spend “quality time” with their grandparents.70
 Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion for the Supreme 
Court. She concluded that the trial court had erred in giving “no spe-
cial weight at all to [the mother’s] determination of her daughters’ 
best interests.”71 Absent a finding of fitness, the court should have 
given deference to the mother’s analysis of what was in her children’s 
best interests. Thus, the fundamental right that the Court recognizes 
as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized 
by [the] Court”72 was premised on the conclusion “that a fit parent 
will act in the best interest of his or her child.”73 The Court held: 
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., 
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself 
into the private realm of the family to further question the ability 
of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of 
that parent’s children.74  
One Supreme Court case explained:  
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that par-
ents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capac-
ity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More 
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of af-
fection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.75  
 This critical threshold premise has been the guiding principle as 
states consider the constitutionality of their third-party visitation 
laws after Troxel. For example, when California considered the con-
stitutionality of its nonparental visitation statute, it emphasized that 
Troxel held that parents’ fundamental rights are threatened when 
the “court exercises this discretion to substitute its own judgment of 
a child’s best interests for that of a competent custodial parent.”76 
The threshold presumption these courts make is that fit parents do 
act in the best interests of their children.77 
                                                                                                                                 
 69. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61, 66-67. 
 70. Id. at 62. 
 71. Id. at 69; Dubler, supra note 65, at 109. 
 72. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
 73. Id. at 69. 
 74. Id. at 68. 
 75. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 76. Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  
 77. Id. at 1109. 
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 The premise of the BIOC standard—that parents universally and 
exclusively act in the best interests of their children—inaccurately 
frames parental decision-making around a lens of autono(thee) pa-
rental decision-making. Critically, the BIOC standard is not neces-
sarily the standard that all parents use when they make day-to-day 
parenting decisions free from state oversight or intervention. Perpet-
uating this myth is surely detrimental to parents, particularly moth-
ers, but deeply detrimental to normative framings of women’s abor-
tion decision-making.  
 The premise that parents make decisions always and narrowly in 
the BIOC is not necessarily descriptive of how parental decision-
making actually occurs. Although it may certainly express the state’s 
normative goals for parenting behaviors, the BIOC standard is not 
scientifically studied, taught to parents, or empirically supported.78 
Rather, while parents make decisions every day on behalf of their 
children, “surprisingly little work has addressed the process by which 
parents make decisions for their children.”79 In particular, “no work 
has systemically examined how parents’ decisions for their children 
differ from how they decide for themselves in identical situations”—a 
critical area of inquiry relevant to this Article.80 Even if work had 
been done, parenting norms change by historical period and across 
geographies and cultures.81 Consider, for example, differences in 
feeding and sleeping practices, discipline, employment, and marriage 
age, to name a few. Most existing work chronicles how parents make 
certain types of decisions, such as medical and childcare, but not sys-
temically how they make decisions for their children as compared to 
for themselves.82 
 Parenting, particularly in Western cultures, is done in relative 
isolation.83 It is done with relatively little training, guidance, educa-
                                                                                                                                 
 78. See VAL GILLIES, MARGINALISED MOTHERS: EXPLORING WORKING-CLASS 
EXPERIENCES OF PARENTING 156 (2007) (presenting research that “seriously undermines 
the notion that mothering skills are universal, easily abstracted and able to be neutrally 
conveyed in the form of parenting classes”). 
 79. Rebecca A. Dore et al., A Social Values Analysis of Parental Decision Making, 148 
J. PSYCHOL. 477, 477 (2014) (concluding this lack of work is “unfortunate”).  
 80.  Id. at 478 (anticipating that parents would be more risk-averse on behalf of 
their children). 
 81. SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 21 (1996) (“At 
any given time and place one particular model tends to take precedence over all others. 
American mothers and fathers, just like parents of other times and places, are likely to 
recognize this dominant model of appropriate child rearing and feel pressed to adopt or 
reject it in whole or in part.”). 
 82. Dore et al., supra note 79, at 480. 
 83. TINA MILLER, MAKING SENSE OF MOTHERHOOD: A NARRATIVE APPROACH 113 
(2005) (concluding that mothers do not “admit how burdensome the constraints and diffi-
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tion, or support.84 Despite a proliferation of “how to” books on parent-
ing, interest and research in parental development is relatively un-
derdeveloped.85 Setting aside “computer-like images of thinking” is 
thus important in understanding parenting.86 Any framing of stand-
ardized parenting wrongly suggests that parenting is essentialized 
across race, class, age, gender, and immigration status.87 
 Even when parents have the best interests of their children at 
heart, that does not necessarily translate into the ability to act on the 
parent’s determination of the best interests of their children.88 Ra-
ther, parental decision-making is often more survivalist within a 
“limited framework of choices and opportunities.”89 For example, the 
decision of what form of childcare is in the BIOC is constrained by 
“family finances, inflexible work schedules, and limited availability of 
suitable options” and differs according to “parents’ preferences, val-
ues, and worries,” all of which factor into their decision-making.90 
Economics scholarship studying how families allocate resources and 
make decisions further reveals these complexities.91  
 Finally, family law scholars have also long recognized that even 
the state is not well-equipped to make BIOC determinations, no mat-
                                                                                                                                 
culties of their condition can be,” as the children are in a relatively private and isolated 
sense that “perpetuate[s] self-reliance”). 
 84. MARVIN J. FINE, PARENTS VS. CHILDREN: MAKING THE RELATIONSHIP WORK 168 
(1979) (“Parents seem to have been a forgotten group in relation to their education. Our socie-
ty has treated parenthood as something that people learn about automatically; yet many of us 
found ourselves less than adequately prepared for the day-to-day challenges of parenthood.”). 
 85. See Jack Demick, Stages of Parental Development, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 
389, 408-09 (Marc H. Bornstein ed., 2d ed. 2002) (noting the lack of research suggests that 
“how-to” books should be reviewed cautiously).  
 86. Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Parents’ Knowledge and Expectations: Using What We 
Know, in HANDBOOK OF PARENTING, supra note 85, at 439, 456. 
 87. See generally LAURA ELDER & STEVEN GREENE, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLITICIZATION AND POLARIZATION OF THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY (2012) (summarizing research concluding that parenthood is political and that it 
differs by gender, class, etc.); HAYS, supra note 81, at 76 (“Every mother’s ideas about 
mothering are shaped by a complex map of her class position, race, ethnic heritage, reli-
gious background, political beliefs, sexual preferences, physical abilities or disabilities, 
citizenship status, participation in various subcultures, places of residence, workplace en-
vironment, formal education, the techniques her own parents used to raise her—and 
more.”); MILLER, supra note 83, at 6 (“[M]otherhood is differently patterned and shaped in 
different contexts.”). 
 88. See, e.g., KAREN WELLS, CHILDHOOD IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 11 (2015) (“[A] 
protected, nurturing childhood has been available only to a minority of elite . . . children.”).  
 89. GILLIES, supra note 78, at 159. 
 90. Laura Sosinsky, How Parents Make Child Care Decisions, CHILD TRENDS:  
BLOG (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.childtrends.org/how-parents-make-child-care-decisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/2GMX-2XNQ]. 
 91. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (analyzing family life 
with a rational choice approach); Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theo-
ry, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962). 
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ter how noble its objectives might be. Not trained in the “dynamics of 
interpersonal relationships and the developmental needs of children, 
judges increasingly look[] to mental health professionals and the so-
cial sciences for help in determining the child’s best interest.”92 The 
law lacks the “capacity to supervise the delicately complex interper-
sonal bonds between parent and child.”93  
 This autono(thee) framing is inaccurate and problematic, particu-
larly for mothers. It feeds into a long, troublesome historical narra-
tive of differing gendered norms and expectations of parents.94 While 
the BIOC standard is unequivocally gender-neutral, social norms and 
expectations still presume that mothers uniquely put the needs of 
others first.95 It uniquely requires a woman “to subordinate her own 
interests and to put the children first.”96 Mothers are uniquely “de-
fined through an articulation of their children’s needs,” a hierarchy 
which leaves a mother’s needs “occluded by the needs of her chil-
dren.”97 Mothers’ needs are thought to be actualized by the child, and 
women’s needs are reframed as desires.98 Tethering abortion deci-
sion-making to parental decision-making might powerfully expose 
these differences in gender norms and align abortion decision-making 
with parental decision-making in more gender-neutral ways. 
 Pretending that parenting is done in an autono(thee) lens also 
complicates parenting framing broadly. It falsely suggests that 
parenthood is a one-way street in which parents are believed to 
shape and direct their children’s upbringing, but little recognition is 
given to other influences, forces, or the general reciprocal nature of 
family relationships. Anne-Marie Ambert’s research in The Effect of 
Children on Parents, concludes that “[t]his perspective has too fre-
quently resulted in a narrow interpretation of family dynamics em-
phasizing the effect that parents have on their offspring without re-
gard for other, more potent influences on children.”99 This approach 
                                                                                                                                 
 92. Elrod & Dale, supra note 48, at 384. 
 93. Carbone, supra note 59, at S118 (quoting Newmark v Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 
1115, 1116 (Del. 1991); Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State 
Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649 n.13, 14 (1977)). 
 94. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND 
INSTITUTION 14 (1976) (critiquing the ways in which mothering is “defined and restricted 
under patriarchy”).  
 95. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 81. 
 96. DIANE RICHARDSON, WOMEN, MOTHERHOOD AND CHILDREARING 7 (1993).  
 97. JULIE A. WALLBANK, CHALLENGING MOTHERHOOD(S) 5 (2001).  
 98. Id.  
 99. ANNE-MARIE AMBERT, THE EFFECT OF CHILDREN ON PARENTS 13 (2d ed. 2001) 
(explaining how concepts of socialization, childrearing, and child development have created 
an exaggerated “parental causality in parent-child interaction and child outcomes.”). “This 
approach totally ignores the larger environment in which children evolve,” and it reflects a 
 
1298  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1281 
  
 
ignores a “multiplicity of influences” that affect children and ignores 
the impact that children have on parents.100 Children do influence 
parents in their health, place / space of their activities, employment, 
finances, marital and family relationships, personalities, attitudes, 
values, beliefs, life plans, and feelings of control over life.101  
 This legal framing of parenting as a one-way street is costly for 
parents. It “has misled entire cohorts of parents into believing that 
they could control their children’s future and shape its contours.”102 
Treating parenthood as a one-way street renders it not “socially 
proper for parents to admit that they have problems with their chil-
dren or that their children are affecting them negatively.”103 Parent-
ing is not a one-way street of parents actualizing their children’s best 
interests. It is highly contextual as explored further in Section III.C. 
Indeed, both parental decision-making and women’s abortion deci-
sion-making are actually more multi-dimensional, inclusive, and 
aligned than the law reflects as the next Section explores. 
III.   THE UNIFIED COMPLEXITIES OF FAMILY DECISION-MAKING  
 While legal framings of reproductive decision-making are described 
as a right to privacy, the realities of that decision-making have never 
been legally framed around the woman alone. Women actually make 
decisions focused on their children and families and in consultation 
with doctors.104 Likewise, parental decision-making also squarely con-
siders that stable and healthy parents and family units are central to 
decision-making.105 It is not accurate to frame either category of deci-
sion-making as a one-dimensional lens. Abortion decision-making is not 
a mirror in which the decision-maker does exclusively what is best for 
her. Likewise, parental decision-making is not a myopic outward-
looking scope in which only the children are within sight and only their 
needs in the abstract are considered. Rather, family decision-making is 
complex and varied. Decisions are made, not exclusively in the BIOC, 
but considering complex layers of interconnectedness.106 Both catego-
                                                                                                                                 
“scientific bias” that “negates environmental, genetic, and reciprocal effects between par-
ents and children.” Id. at 14.  
 100. Id. at 21. 
 101. Id. at 49-67. 
 102. Id. at 20. 
 103. Id. at 68. 
 104. See infra section III.D.1 (analyzing how women make decisions in consultation 
with others).  
 105. See infra section III.C (analyzing how parents can make decision in their  
own interests).  
 106. Robert D. Hess, Approaches to the Measurement and Interpretation of Parent-
Child Interaction, in PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PROSPECTS 
207, 207-08 (Ronald W. Henderson ed., 1981) (concluding that unique genetic linkages, 
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ries of decision-making are multi-dimensional and include difficult bal-
ancing considerations of the self and others. This next Section explores 
and explains this unified framing of family decision-making. 
A.   A Unified Model  
 The realities of abortion decision-making and parental decision-
making reveal that a more unified framework governs in practice.107 
The below image reveals a more accurate depiction of the decision-
making frameworks that actually govern parenting and reproductive 
decision-making—visually depicting critiques that have been raised 
for some time by relational feminist accounts challenging both priva-
cy and rights-based framings.108 This image reveals that a unified 
lens of family-based decision-making includes lenses of autono(me) 
that squarely focus on the decision-maker, lenses of autono(thee) that 
squarely focus on individuals other than the decision-maker, and au-
tono(we) that focus on the interrelatedness of the family unit as a 
whole. The impact of revealing a more unified model of how decisions 
are made does critical work bringing parental decision-making and 
women’s abortion decision-making closer together. 
 This unified decision-making framework stands regardless of an 
individual decision-maker’s unique views on parenting or reproduc-
tion, and it de-genders decision-making. For example, a woman deci-
sion-maker who decides to continue a pregnancy can do so in an au-
tono(me) lens that actualizes her subjective religious and moral un-
derstandings of the decision for her. She might also be understood to 
make the decision in an autono(thee) lens that she perceives to actu-
alize the best interests of the child. She might also be understood to 
make the decision in an autono(we) lens that is focused on the needs 
                                                                                                                                 
affective bonding, continuity of family ties, distribution of authority and power, social roles 
and norms, and external influences upon family interaction disrupts and complicates the 
academic study of family behavior).  
 107. See generally Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection 
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 939 (2011) (“[Abortion] 
should be disposed of under the rubrics of family law, rather than the law governing the 
Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).  
 108. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004) (exposing the inaccuracies of framing policy around the marital family 
household as separate and self-sufficient, and arguing for societal organization around 
caregiving relationships); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF 
SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011) (describing the inadequacies of framing of autonomy as 
independence in an individual rights context); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable 
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) 
(advocating for a more responsive state to the inherent and ongoing status of human 
vulnerability); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989) (arguing for a new conception of autonomy in feminism). 
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of her partner, parents, or other members of the family and commu-
nity in a more broad and interconnected way. 
 In contrast, a woman decision-maker who decides to terminate a 
pregnancy can be understood to make that decision in an autono(me) 
lens to actualize her freedom to control her body and her reproduc-
tion. She might also be understood to make that decision in an au-
tono(thee) lens that she perceives to actualize the best interests of 
that child or another child. She might also be understood to make the 
decision in an autono(we) lens that is focused on the needs of her 
partner, parents, existing children, future children, or future part-
ners in a more interconnected way.109 The below image depicts this 
unified model and its intersections.  
                                                                                                                                 
 109. See Cockrill & Weitz, supra note 42, at 18 (“[W]omen in our study considered each law 
and attempted to balance the rights of women to make decisions and be informed with the 
responsibility of women to make conscientious decisions for themselves and their families.”).  
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B.   Autono(thee) Decision-Making in Abortion 
 Women’s abortion decision-making, like parenting, also reflects im-
portant dimensions of the autono(thee) decision-making framework. 
Research on how women actually make reproductive decisions strongly 
supports this point. Nearly 60% of the women who terminate a preg-
nancy have already given birth to at least one child before terminating 
a later pregnancy.110 One-third of the women terminating their preg-
nancies have had two or more children already.111 Thus, women who 
are already mothers are the most likely category of women to have 
abortions, by a growing margin.112 This is often due to the crushing 
financial pressures of parenthood.113 As one woman stated, “We feel we 
have to choose between our unborn child and our born children.”114  
 Women as reproductive decision-makers “want the conditions to 
be right when they do [have children], and women who already are 
mothers want to care responsibly for their existing children.”115 Im-
portantly, it is not just that they already have children in the ab-
stract, but that they do not think that they can “have another child 
without compromising the care given to the existing children.”116 
Women can “often choose abortion because of their wish to be good 
parents.”117 This was distinctly revealed in the Purser v. Owens case 
in which the lower court improperly took custody of the mother’s 
children from her based on her decision to have a subsequent abor-
tion.118 Women in narrative interviews regularly “deemphasized how 
the physical problems [of pregnancy] interrupted their own lives or 
activities and instead emphasized the impact that they had on their 
abilities to care for their children that they already had.”119 Narrative 
survey respondents who already had children likewise revealed that 
they had abortions to “dedicate the financial, emotional, and physical 
                                                                                                                                 
 110. Who’s Getting Abortions? Not Who You’d Think, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 
2008, 6:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22689931/ns/health-womens_health/t/ 
whos-getting-abortions-not-who-youd-think/#.V1W4P1dxgUU [https://perma.cc/XFZ4-GLYL] 
(noting critical racial disparities in abortion due to “hard times”).  
 111. Id. 
 112. Lauren Sandler, The Mother Majority, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2011, 4:34 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/10/most_surprising_abortion_statistic
_the_majority_of_women_who_ter.html [https://perma.cc/N45J-QX3A].  
 113. Who’s Getting Abortions? Not Who You’d Think, supra note 110. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (quoting Rachel Jones, Guttmacher Institute Researcher).  
 116. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 88. 
 117. Who’s Getting Abortions? Not Who You’d Think, supra note 110. 
 118. Purser v. Owens, 722 S.E.2d 225, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011); see also supra notes 
15-26 and accompanying text. 
 119. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 90. 
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resources that they had—which were often limited—to the children 
whom they were already supporting.”120  
 This reveals that it is a myth to pretend that all women make de-
cisions in an individualistic lens. The National Abortion Federation 
takes the myth that “[w]omen have abortions for selfish or frivolous 
reasons” on directly.121 It explains clearly that women, in reality, 
“base their decision[s] on several factors, the most common being lack 
of money and / or unreadiness to start or expand their families due to 
existing responsibilities.”122 In fact, 66% of women who terminate a 
pregnancy plan to have children later when they are better able to 
provide for their children or are in better relationships.123 This sug-
gests that the challenges of living up to the societal and legal de-
mands of acting in the best interests of children is a heavy burden 
that women take seriously, so seriously that it may sometimes cause 
them to opt out of parenting and terminate a pregnancy. 
 This data suggests that abortion can be an external decision fo-
cused on the well-being of others, rather than self. Some decision-
making frameworks governing abortion are unequivocally an au-
tono(thee) decision-making framework, which maps and follows the 
legal norms we purport to impose on parents. For some women, ter-
minating a pregnancy is a means to ensure that they are the kind of 
mothers they wanted to be (or perhaps, that the law expected them to 
be) to their existing children.124  
C.   Autono(me) Decision-Making in Parenting 
 It is likewise inaccurate to frame all parental decision-making as 
exclusively child-focused. Some parental decision-making is also fo-
cused on the decision-maker parent. Sometimes the trade-offs in-
volved in family decision-making explicitly include putting parents’ 
needs first. Free from state intervention, parents can—and indeed 
do—sometimes subordinate their children’s interests to “the interests 
of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or 
guardians themselves.”125 Parenting is not universally a self-
                                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. at 91. 
 121. NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, WOMEN WHO HAVE ABORTIONS 2 (2003), 
https://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/women_who_have_abortions.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7R28-36XH].  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 91, 98 (summarizing how some women who terminate 
pregnancies “believed that terminating the current pregnancy was the best decision to 
make to be or remain a good mother”). 
 125. Carbone, supra note 59, at S113.  
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sacrificial, myopic enterprise that systemically puts children’s needs 
before all else.126 There must be a “me” in parental decision-making.  
 Parenting includes critical self-care.127 Taking care of yourself is 
“related to your child’s functioning in the home and provides an im-
portant contextual influence.”128 Tending to individual needs, not just 
the needs of children, includes time for oneself, time with spouses 
and friends, and stress minimization.129 “[B]uilding in your own 
downtime, your own social interaction, your own special routines 
with your spouse or friends. . . . If you’re flat-out all the time, you’re 
going to break down, or at least show the negative effects of that 
stress in how you interact with your child.”130 The autono(me) com-
ponents may be about self-care, but also about the advancement of 
self as explored more below in the relocation cases for the purposes of 
caring for others. This is reflected in the diagram above. Self-care 
might reflect intersections between autono(me), autono(thee), and 
autono(we), although initially understood as being about self.  
 While the BIOC standard is a universally accepted standard for 
the state to apply, the premise that parents actually make decisions 
in this lens is not universally accepted. Other jurisdictions give par-
amount consideration when the state is considering the children’s 
welfare, but do not begin from the standpoint that parents actually 
apply a BIOC analysis themselves. The paramountcy principle re-
quires courts to consider the state’s best interests without regard to 
other interests.131 The paramountcy of putting children’s interests 
before all else, however, does not universally “apply to parents or 
other individuals with respect to their day to day or even long-term 
decisions affecting the child.”132 This legal framework acknowledges 
that parents can consider their own interests in careers, moving, and 
                                                                                                                                 
 126. See generally Naomi Cahn, State Representation of Children’s Interests, 40 FAM. 
L.Q. 109, 131 (2006) (“[R]ather than the paradigmatic triangle of parents, children, and the 
state, we must think of a rectangular pyramid that places children at the top, but has a 
base that includes family, state, international actors, and, as the final point, civil society 
and other nongovernmental actors.”).  
 127. FINE, supra note 84, at 154 (“It is important for family members to be aware of 
their own needs within a family structure so that others can become aware and the 
needs met, if appropriate. Families vary in what they do for their members in relation to 
individual needs.”). 
 128. ALAN E. KAZDIN, EVERYDAY PARENTING TOOLKIT 138 (2013). 
 129. Id. at 139 (“This isn’t ‘me generation’ propaganda or ‘I come first’ selfishness; it’s what 
the research on parent-child interaction tells us about the best route to effective parenting.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Helen Reece, Subverting the Stigmatization Argument, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y 
484, 484 (1996) (explaining that section 1(1) of the Children Act of 1989 requires courts to 
make the child’s welfare the court’s paramount consideration regarding the upbringing of 
children and “no other interests or values may affect the decision”).  
 132. RICHARD WHITE ET AL., THE CHILDREN ACT IN PRACTICE 27 (4th ed. 2008).  
2017] REPRODUCTIVE AND PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING 1305 
 
 
divorcing, for example.133 One commentator summarizes how the 
state may very well have norms that parents act in their children’s 
best interests, but they are not legally enshrined:  
It can hardly be argued that parents, in taking family decisions 
affecting a child, are bound to ignore completely their own inter-
ests, the interests of other members of the family and, possibly, 
outsiders. This would be a wholly undesirable, as well as an unre-
alistic objective. . . .  
Those who imply that the welfare principle has this much 
wider application [to parents] are really expressing the hope that 
society in general, and individual adults, will, in their decisions, 
feel it appropriate to act in the best interests of children, as they 
see them. . . . The [Children] Act reposes a great deal of trust in 
parents that they will know what is best for their children and 
act accordingly. Whether this level of trust is justified by the his-
torical record is something which at least one commentator was 
quick to question.134 
These comments reveal how the legal premise that parents act exclu-
sively in their children’s best interests may be a legal norm, but it is 
not a factually descriptive account of all parental decision-making. 
 American family law cases also acknowledge that the focus is 
more properly on parents’ interests in certain contexts. Parental relo-
cation cases are an ideal lens to deconstruct some of the challenges 
family courts face in trying to identify the outcome that is in the 
BIOC because they reveal the challenges of disconnecting the chil-
dren’s best interests (autono(thee)) from the parent’s interests (au-
tono(me)).135 They reveal the courts’ struggles with the BIOC au-
tono(thee) framework,136 reflecting the “San Andreas Fault of chil-
dren’s law” because of the deep tensions exposed.137  
 Relocation cases force courts to consider the parent’s fundamental 
right to travel, the BIOC, and the fundamental right of the nonrelo-
                                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. 
 134. ANDREW BAINHAM, CHILDREN: THE MODERN LAW 45 (3d ed. 2005).  
 135. Linda D. Elrod, A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the Child 
Emerging as the Standard for Relocation Cases, in RELOCATION ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY 
CASES 29, 30 (Philip M. Stahl & Leslie M. Drozd eds., 2006) (noting that relocation cases 
are some of the “knottiest and most disturbing problems”).  
 136. Id. 
 137. Jonathan Crowe & Lisa Toohey, From Good Intentions to Ethical Outcomes: The 
Paramountcy of Children’s Interests in the Family Law Act, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 391, 412 
(2009) (quoting Richard Chisholm, “The Paramount Consideration”: Children’s Interests in 
Family Law, 16 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 87, 108 (2002)). As evidence of the challenges presented, 
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers sought to draft a model relocation statute 
and was unable to reach consensus on the burden of proof in these thorny cases, ultimately 
proposing three different alternatives. See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 
Proposed Model Relocation Act, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1998). 
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cating parent to the care, custody, and control of his or her chil-
dren.138 States have resolved these competing rights differently.139 
Some states elevate the children’s welfare to trump the parent’s right 
to travel140 while other states reject this hierarchy and conclude that 
parents and children are on equal footing to demonstrate (using stat-
utory factors) what is in the children’s best interests.141 The trend 
across the states is toward abandoning any presumptions favoring or 
disfavoring relocation and toward a BIOC standard.142  
 When this BIOC standard is applied and the state has enumerat-
ed specific factors governing relocation cases, however, notably these 
factors often “stress ‘parent’ considerations such as the distance, cost 
and difficulty of visitation.”143 The American Law Institute, for ex-
ample, recognizes valid reasons for a move to include being closer to 
family or support, addressing health care problems, protecting the 
children from harm, pursuing employment or education, uniting with 
a spouse or partner pursuing employment or education, and improv-
ing quality of life for the family.144 While framed around a BIOC 
standard, these factors notably consider the needs of the parent ex-
plicitly in ways that the ordinary BIOC standard does not. 
 There are other contexts as well where the BIOC standard might 
seem to be the most appropriate standard, but it is not what the state 
actually uses. Parental discipline is a good example of this distinc-
tion. Tort law and family law protect a parent’s right to use some 
physical force when disciplining a child. This right stands and re-
mains unchanged “although pediatric and psychological studies 
overwhelmingly conclude that corporal punishment does not benefit 
children and can harm them.”145 Likewise, child labor laws exempt 
                                                                                                                                 
 138. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (describing the fundamental 
right to parent); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (analyzing the fundamental 
constitutional rights of parents).  
 139. See Theresa Glennon, Divided Parents, Shared Children: Conflicting Approaches 
to Relocation Disputes in the USA, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 55, 56 (2008) (noting that legislative 
activity has increased considerably).  
 140. Elrod, supra note 135, at 32-33 (citing Minnesota as an example). 
 141. Id. at 33 (citing Colorado, Maryland, and New Mexico as examples). 
 142. Id. at 39.  
 143. Id. at 41. For example, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers’ factors 
include “[w]hether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life for both the custo-
dial party seeking relocation and the child, including but not limited to financial or emo-
tional benefit or educational opportunity.” Id. (providing a comprehensive list of factors).  
 144. Id. at 43-44 (noting that some states have approved the American Law Institute’s 
list, such as Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia).  
 145. See HASDAY, supra note 43, at 148 (“Researchers have repeatedly found that 
corporal punishment can inflict physical damage; undermine trust, confidence, self-esteem, 
and mental health; impair the quality of the parent-child relationship; contribute to 
delinquent, counterproductive, and antisocial behavior; and increase the chances that the 
child will be violent and will accept violence as an adult.”). 
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certain activities, such as farming, despite these being some of the 
most dangerous jobs for children, causing catastrophic injuries.146  
 There are also many contexts in which the state does not apply a 
BIOC analysis, although one might seem logical or appropriate, such 
as in parentage, immigration law, military service, and juvenile de-
tention.147 The state is also only interested in whether parents are 
actually acting in the BIOC standard when conflict arises, not in the 
abstract or general sense.148  
 There are also examples in which the state itself has prioritized 
an autono(me) lens over autono(thee). For example, some jurisdic-
tions have created statutory presumptions favoring joint custody.149 
There is a tension, however, in this presumption, which favors the 
parenting rights of both parents, but may not necessarily actualize 
the BIOC.150 In lobbying efforts by the men’s rights movements for 
joint custody, such efforts could certainly be framed in the BIOC us-
ing some social science research, but that research is conflicting at 
best. Fights for presumptions of joint custody might also be framed in 
an autono(me) lens as an exercise in parental rights under the prem-
ise that what is good for the parent is good for the child.  
                                                                                                                                 
 146. See id. at 149-50 (explaining that critics will not adopt child labor laws in these 
settings because they interfere with parents’ control of their children). 
 147. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (concluding that the 
biological daughter’s interest in having a relationship with her biological father did not merit 
any finding of parentage over the claims of the marital father). See generally Christine Piper, 
Child Focused Legislation: For the Sake of the Children?, in FIFTY YEARS IN FAMILY LAW 71, 
71 (Rebecca Probert & Chris Barton eds., 2012) (explaining that what is in the BIOC is a 
“contested area, subject to changing values, knowledge, fears and aspirations”); John A. 
Lynch, Jr., Military Law: Time to Mandate Best Interests of the Child to Restrict 
Deployments of Parents That Affect Preschool Children, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 148 
(2015) (arguing that the BIOC standard should be considered in military deployments).  
 148. See Carbone, supra note 59, at 115 (clarifying that the BIOC standard does not 
apply if parents meet certain minimum requirements of caring for their children). 
 149. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 326 (citing Minnesota as an example of a state with a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of joint custody upon request of either party); see also 
Children (Access to Parents) Bill 2010-1, HC Bill [174] cl. 1 (Eng., Wales, N. Ir.) (“[T]he 
court must act on the presumption that the child’s welfare is best served through having 
reasonable access to and contact with both parents unless exceptional circumstances are 
demonstrated that such access and contact is not in the best interests of the child.”).  
 150. Bajackson, supra note 46, at 323-24 (quoting critics who argue that a joint custody 
presumption “flies in the face of the national trend to put children first in all custody 
decisions”). Some states have thus expressed a preference for joint custody, but not gone so 
far as to create a rebuttable presumption. Id. at 326 (citing Kansas and Wisconsin as 
examples); see, e.g., R.S. v. J.S., 457 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining how 
Missouri policy encourages both parents to share in parenting decisions, but clarifying that 
“[t]here is no preference for joint custody unless, in the given circumstances, it is in the 
best interests of the child”). Both parents have to be willing to “share the rights and 
responsibilities related to raising their children” in order for a preference of joint custody to 
apply. Id. at 392 (quoting Dunkle v. Dunkle, 158 S.W.3d 823, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)). 
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 This tension between the constitutional rights of parents and the 
BIOC standard has been revealed in Australian jurisprudence.151 The 
Family Law Act of Australia requires courts to focus on the BIOC 
standard and explicitly make this the “paramount consideration.”152 
This paramountcy principle is intended to discourage excessive ad-
versarialness and alleviate children’s harm from parental conflict.153 
Yet, these good intentions are difficult to implement ethically. The 
premise of the ethics of paramountcy seems to be embedded in the 
idea that parents place the best interests of their children ahead of 
their own.154 This, of course, risks becoming gendered with a stronger 
“social discourse which holds that women must consistently be will-
ing to sacrifice their own interests in [favor] of their offspring’s and 
that to do otherwise is to be deficient as a mother,” as noted above.155 
The authors, therefore, argue that only a relatively weak interpreta-
tion of this principle can withstand ethical analysis.156 This means 
that the BIOC should be the primary factor considered, but not nec-
essarily the only factor, thus disregarding other interests that may be 
of significance.157  
 The question becomes how far this principle of paramountcy must 
go; does it mean that parents “are not permitted to do anything that 
will impinge upon the child’s best interests, regardless of its impact 
on their own wellbeing”?158 As an illustration, the authors provide an 
example of parents pursuing careers or relaxation, resulting in per-
sonal gain for the parent(s), but with a slight reduction in the child’s 
best interests. These types of questions run into conflict with “com-
mon-sense” understandings of parental responsibilities, by which we 
allow parents to make trade-offs between their own interests and 
their children’s interests.159 Parents do have an obligation to consider 
                                                                                                                                 
 151. See Bajackson, supra note 46, at 348-51 (noting that many countries consider 
Australia to be the most child-focused model, “almost to the point of being unethically 
against the weight of the parents’ rights”).  
 152. Crowe & Toohey, supra note 137, at 391 (citing Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CA 
(Austl.), to add the “paramountcy principle” in 2006).  
 153. Id. at 392. 
 154. Id. at 393. 
 155. Id. at 404. 
 156. Id. at 392. Additionally, the authors argue “that the strong approach to the 
paramountcy principle violates the basic ethical principle of equal consideration, by placing 
unjustified emphasis on the interests of children while arbitrarily discounting those of 
other parties.” Id. at 405. Further, the authors do not argue that parents should not treat 
their children more favorably than themselves, but that the courts should not enforce this 
absolutely. Id. at 407. 
 157. Id. at 395-96. The authors conclude that the Australian courts have generally 
adopted a strong interpretation. Id. at 396. 
 158. Id. at 408.  
 159. Id. at 409 (noting that this is so long as parents do consistently consider the 
“child’s emotional, physical and material wellbeing”). 
2017] REPRODUCTIVE AND PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING 1309 
 
 
their children’s welfare, but “to [conceptualize] the child’s welfare as 
an overriding good to be [maximized] at the expense of all other in-
terests is both oppressive and senseless.”160 This is even more con-
cerning when understood against the social backdrop in which wom-
en disproportionately bear the weight of domestic labor.161 
 It is inaccurate to frame all parental decision-making as always 
myopically child-centered. Some decision-making is focused on the 
well-being of the parents. Other decision-making is focused on the 
family unit as a whole, as explored in the next Section.  
D.   Autono(we) Decision-Making in Abortion and Parenting 
1.   Autono(we) in Abortion 
 An autono(we) frame is a critical frame to understanding both 
women’s abortion decision-making and parental decision-making. It 
is perhaps the most accurate account of all family decision-making. 
This is a family-centered or community-centered methodology in 
which the focus is not exclusively centered on the decision-maker or 
the subject of the decision. The focus is on the interconnections.  
 The autono(we) frame also dominates some women’s abortion de-
cision-making.162 Women’s abortion decision-making is, in fact, “not 
individualistic or private at all,”163 even if that was the feminist goal. 
Of course, this framing has been heavily criticized as problematic and 
paternalistic.164 Importantly, the constitutional cases espousing a 
woman’s right to privacy did not position a woman’s right to choose 
in isolation. Rather, the right was first framed in Griswold v. Con-
necticut as a right of marital privacy that the couple held.165 Griswold 
first articulated that this right belongs to a “married couple[]” in con-
sultation with a doctor.166 Roe expanded contraceptive decisional au-
                                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. at 409-10.  
 161. Id. at 410. 
 162. Carol Gilligan, for example, has described how women make decisions, including 
abortion decisions, based on an ethic of care and responsibility, considering their 
relationships and obligations to others. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 81. 
 163. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal 
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 569 (2011).  
 164. See, e.g., id. at 595 (concluding that feminists “decry” allowing the state into the 
informed consent conversation between a woman and her doctor as “paternalistic 
infringement”); Lindgren, supra note 39, at 396 (“Abortion scholarship has uniformly 
criticized the medical model of abortion reform for deferring women’s decisionmaking to 
the judgment of physicians.”). 
 165. See 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
 166. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“But, in any event, it is clear that the state 
interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, 
which does not, like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil 
sought to be dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples.”). 
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tonomy to include the right to terminate a pregnancy, but important-
ly and critically, tethered that right to a decision in consultation with 
her doctor.167 The decision was framed as a contextual one. The Court 
acknowledged that the woman would consider the possibilities of psy-
chological harm, mental and physical health, and social stigmas, to 
name a few.168 The companion case of Doe v. Bolton provided further 
insight on the decision-making framework governing a woman’s right 
to terminate a pregnancy.169 Doe clarified what it means to allow an 
abortion for the “health” of the mother. It read the term expansively 
to include a “medical judgment [that] may be exercised in the light of 
all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the 
woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.”170  
 The British statute discussed above likewise explicitly contem-
plates this contextual, family-centered framing. Those circumstances 
include when two doctors agree in good faith that “continuance of the 
pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman or any existing children of her family.”171 The statute further 
allows that when determining the risks, “account may be taken of the 
pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.”172 
 It is detrimental to the framing of women’s abortion decision-
making to strip away relational aspects of the decision. Summarizing 
a study of women with unintended pregnancies, Decoding Abortion 
Rhetoric concluded that women making the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy “did not generally characterize it in the abstract terms of 
the public discourse, such as genetic structure, personhood, or soul,” 
instead framing a relationship as a material experience and weighing 
the decision from there.173 A woman’s decision to terminate a preg-
nancy instead is often about the desire to have a “stable and loving 
famil[y]” in which to raise the child, as explored above.174 
2.   Autono(we) in Parenting (Family) 
 Parents also make decisions in an autono(we) lens. The “we” lens 
can be a family-centered lens or a community-centered lens. First, 
the family-centered lens: Parenting occurs in the context of a family 
                                                                                                                                 
 167. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“All these are factors the woman and her 
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.”).  
 168. Id.  
 169. 410 U.S. 179, 189-92 (1973).  
 170. Id. at 192. 
 171. BURTON, supra note 30 (emphasis added). 
 172. Id.  
 173. CONDIT, supra note 10, at 184. 
 174. Jones et al., supra note 4, at 91. 
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in which people interact and interconnect.175 Parental decision-
making occurs in the context of parents acting as parents to their 
children, parents acting as children of their own parents, and parents 
as individuals with interests and needs.176 The family is an interre-
lated system.177 Changes in any one aspect of the system implicate 
the entire system, whether those changes are external or internal, 
desired or undesired.178 In this system, parents do not make decisions 
myopically focused on the children; they make decisions as “one piece 
of a complex puzzle of work and family life.”179  
 Using the human body as an analogy, the BIOC pretends that—in 
that system—the focus is exclusively on the heart, while each part 
actually feeds and nourishes the health of the other.180 Or, as Helen 
Reece articulated: “[I]t does not follow that in order to protect a child 
adequately his or her welfare must be the sole consideration.”181 Ra-
ther, consider a mother attempting to cross the street safely with her 
three kids of different ages. Her attention will not be on one child 
alone, but instead, on trying to get the whole family across safely.182  
3.   Autono(we) in Parenting (Community) 
 Family decision-making regularly involves difficult trade-offs among 
family members that require consideration of the entire family unit.183 
Parents are “able to balance the interests of their multiple children, 
and the mere fact that their obligations to multiple children conflict 
should not in itself disqualify their judgment.”184 Rather, the relation-
ships they have with their caregivers shape their decision-making 
                                                                                                                                 
 175. FINE, supra note 84, at 151 (“A family is really a system in the ways that the parts 
of the family interact. Each family member takes on a role, has certain relationships with 
other family members, and performs certain activities in relation to the family.”).  
 176. BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OURSELVES AND OUR CHILDREN: A 
BOOK BY AND FOR PARENTS 154-55 (1978).  
 177. See id. at 156. 
 178. FINE, supra note 84, at 152.  
Families are complex systems because many things may be happening and 
changing simultaneously. Not only are the children growing and changing in 
different ways, but so are the parents as individuals and as a couple; in addi-
tion there are many external pressures on a family coming from the economy 
and the community. 
Id. at 154.  
 179. Sosinsky, supra note 90. 
 180. BOSTON WOMEN’S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 176, at 156. 
 181. JONATHAN HERRING ET AL., GREAT DEBATES IN FAMILY LAW 80 (2012). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Carbone, supra note 59, at S118-19.  
 184. Id. at S119. 
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heavily.185 “The best interest of the child standard can only advance 
children’s interests when it is sensitive to the importance of the family 
in creating the context in which children experience the world.”186 
 The realities of parental decision-making are much more contex-
tual and family-centered than an autono(thee) lens alone would sug-
gest. Revisiting Troxel, it is too myopic to pretend that Tommie was 
considering her children with Brad without other factors coming into 
play. For example, she was thinking about her children at issue in 
the case, herself and her spouse, and the larger family unit. It was 
more contextual and interconnected than a narrow focus on these 
children at the exclusive deprivation of all others. The Troxel deci-
sion recognized that “the stories of real families are messy—full of 
conflict, separation, and melding—and that those families still de-
serve to be protected by the Constitution.”187 Families differ from 
household to household and there is “no single ‘normal family.’ ”188 In 
striking down the statute, the Court held that “Tommie was entitled 
to make decisions about what was in her girls’ best interest within 
their web of familial relations.”189 It protected Tommie’s right to 
make decisions “for the family that she forged in the crucible of mul-
tiple relationships and multiple divorces.”190  
 Relocation cases are also a powerful example of the family-
centered lens. Acknowledging the autono(we) lens, in at least one Ar-
kansas case, the court explicitly held that the standard for child cus-
tody was the BIOC standard but that the standard for relocation cas-
es was the “best interests of the family unit as a whole.”191 The court 
explained that the chancellor was to consider the request to relocate 
by determining whether “such a move is in the best interests of the 
family unit as a whole.”192 Other courts do not explicitly use the term 
“best interests of the family,” but they are clear that “the best inter-
est of the child can never be determined in a vacuum without consid-
ering the other members of the family. The circumstances and well-
being of the parents are inextricably entwined with the best interest 
of the child.”193 To underscore its point, the court explained that, 
                                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Dubler, supra note 65, at 111.  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Vo v. Vo, 79 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). This was eventually replaced 
with a presumption in favor of relocation for the custodial parent. See Hollandsworth v. 
Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 663 (Ark. 2003) (putting the burden on the noncustodial par-
ent to rebut the presumption). 
 192. Vo, 79 S.W.3d at 392. 
 193. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 970 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Nev. 1998).  
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technically, if the needs and circumstances of divorcing parents were 
entirely irrelevant, some divorces should not even be granted.194 
Likewise, if the needs of parents are not considered, motions to relo-
cate would rarely be granted because it is almost always in the BIOC 
to be in close physical proximity to both parents.195  
 Distinctions in Louisiana law between how courts handle children 
in a divorce compared to how courts handle the marital home also 
reveal the inaccuracy effectively. The Louisiana code states that de-
terminations regarding the family home must be made using the 
“best interest of the family” standard, considering the economic sta-
tus of the spouses and the needs of the children.196 “Ordinarily, occu-
pancy by the spouse who has custody of the children is in the best 
interest of the family.”197 
 Parental decision-making also occurs in a community-centered 
lens where parents seek to actualize what the community concludes 
is best, which is not necessarily the same as what is in the best inter-
ests of particular children. Social values theory, for example, con-
cludes “that decisions for others are based more on perceptions of so-
cial norms than are self decisions.”198 Some parenting studies support 
this method of decision-making by parents. Research suggests that 
parents actually make decisions “based on what they perceive that 
their peer group values and thinks should be done,” which is a very 
different lens than a myopic child-centered, individualistic analy-
sis.199 This research suggests that parenting occurs in an ongoing ex-
change of information from parents to advisers in the context of rela-
tionships in which each person is also influenced by their perceptions 
of “the other’s capacity and motives, of what each should contribute, 
of what each can ask for or speak about.”200 
 It is a myth that parents exclusively and myopically always make 
decisions in an autono(thee) lens.201 The realities of parental decision-
                                                                                                                                 
 194. Id. (noting that this is not “the law nor public policy”). See generally Michael E. 
Lamb, Placing Children’s Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans, 
10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 98, 98 (2002) (explaining that many family interventions are 
“justified by reference to children’s best interests,” but they are not grounded in 
“reference[s] to developmental theory or the results of scientific research”).  
 195. McGuinness, 970 P.2d at 1079. 
 196. Bridges v. Bridges, 33 So. 3d 914, 919 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:374(B) (2016)).  
 197. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 618 So. 2d 579, 587 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Burrell v. 
Burrell, 437 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 198. Dore et al., supra note 79, at 497. 
 199. See id. (noting that the results of these findings can be both positive and negative). 
 200. Goodnow, supra note 86, at 456. 
 201. See MICHAEL WYNESS, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 136 (2d ed. 2012) (describing this 
as the “paramount consideration of parents”).  
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making are much more diverse and complex. Both parenting  
and abortion decision-making also include clear autono(me) and  
autono(we) framings.  
IV.   WHY USE PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING TO UNDERSTAND AND 
SUPPORT WOMEN’S DECISION-MAKING? 
 Merely revealing the problematic polarizations discussed in 
Sections II and III is not enough. It is time to explore and reconsider 
longstanding tensions and boundaries for the specific purpose of 
destigmatizing and de-essentializing abortion decision-making given 
the otherwise perilous political trajectory of the reproductive rights 
movement, existing tensions in the movement that clash with 
pragmatic realities, and doctrinal connections.202 Each of these 
reasons for reframing abortion decision-making and aligning it with 
parental decision-making are discussed below.  
A.   The Reproductive Rights Movement’s Trajectory 
 A unified approach is necessary because women’s abortion deci-
sion-making is marginalized and receding in the courts, legislatures, 
and agencies, at both the federal and state level. Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt did critical work to halt the aggressive pace and 
content of restrictive measures, but it did nothing to expand access, 
destigmatize, or strengthen allies.203  
                                                                                                                                 
 202. See, e.g., Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2015) (arguing that “[parental] rights are not compatible with normative 
commitments to equal protection or moral equality between persons” and proposing a 
“deliberate effort to roll back the substantive due process rights jurisprudence that 
constitutionally enshrines parental rights of an independent vitality separate from those 
that follow from children’s rights and interests”).  
 203. In March 2016, the United States Supreme Court considered its first major 
abortion case in a decade. Whole Woman’s Health examined just how far a state could go 
in passing legislation purportedly to benefit women’s health within the parameters set 
out in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. See Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). This case came at a particularly 
volatile time for the Supreme Court in the wake of Justice Scalia’s passing, and renewed 
and recharged a national conversation surrounding the legality of abortion. In a 5-3 
decision, the Court reaffirmed the undue burden standard set out in Casey and struck 
down the admitting privileges requirement and the ambulatory-surgical center 
requirements of Texas House Bill 2. Id. at 2300. The Court concluded that these 
provisions created an undue burden and emphasized that the state must consider the 
burdens of restrictive laws, but also the benefits provided. Id. at 2309. House Bill 2 had 
not been enacted with sufficient evidence supporting benefits to women’s health. This 
decision did considerable work to position abortion as a safe procedure akin to other 
medical procedures, but it did not advance understanding of how and why women 
terminate their pregnancies or the constitutional principles that protect their decision-
making autonomy. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole 
Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 
YALE L.J.F. 149, 149-50 (2016) (analyzing the impact of Whole Woman’s Health).  
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 Abortion decision-making is presently dangerously untethered 
from health care.204 Abortion services are increasingly “isolated from 
mainstream medicine” in who provides medical care, where the med-
ical care is provided, and how the care is provided.205 While 80% of 
abortions were in hospitals in 1973, by 1981, stand-alone clinics out-
numbered hospitals, and 15 years later, 90% of all abortions were 
performed in clinics.206 This isolation has exacerbated security and 
safety concerns to dangerous levels.207 The Guttmacher Institute re-
ports that there are only 367 abortion providers in doctors’ offices na-
tionwide, down from 700 in 1982.208 This isolation was never the 
“feminist plan.”209 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act furthered this 
separation when it explicitly excluded abortion from coverage re-
quirements, even pre-viability abortions and even when the woman’s 
health is in jeopardy—a move that distanced abortion problematical-
ly from the delivery of healthcare services.210 The impact of this legis-
lation on access was critical. Before enactment of the Affordable Care 
Act, approximately 87% of private insurance plans covered abor-
tion.211 Private and public coverage alike are dramatically reduced 
today.212 Abortion care is not included as an Essential Health Benefit 
that must be included in a qualifying plan.213 By 2017, federal regula-
                                                                                                                                 
 204. See generally Lindgren, supra note 39 (analyzing the decoupling of abortion 
and healthcare).  
 205. Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18abortion-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/SX3P-UTNE]. 
 206. Id. (concluding that clinics “truly came to stand alone”). 
 207. See generally DAVID S. COHEN & KRYSTEN CONNON, LIVING IN THE CROSSHAIRS: THE 
UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM (2015) (analyzing the types and extent of 
harassment and terrorism as well as the strategies that providers deploy to respond).  
 208. Bazelon, supra note 205.  
 209. Id. “The clinics’ founders didn’t intend them to become virtually the only settings 
for abortion services in many communities.” Id. (quoting Carole Joffe). Rather, since Roe: 
[T]he shadow of the greedy, butchering “abortionist” continued to hover, and many 
doctors didn’t want to stand in it. As mainstream medicine backed away, feminist 
activists stepped in. They set up stand-alone clinics to care for women in their 
moments of crisis. In many ways, the clinics were a rebel-sister success story. 
Id. (noting that this positioned clinics as targets of extremism). 
 210. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1358 (describing Congress’s legislative move as a 
“pariah designation”).  
 211. Id. at 1363.  
 212. Id. at 1380. 
 213. See Alina Salganicoff et al., Coverage for Abortion Services in Medicaid, 
Marketplace Plans and Private Plans, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 20 2016), 
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-in- 
medicaid-marketplace-plans-and-private-plans/ [https://perma.cc/R77T-75F5]. Since the 
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tions require at least one multi-state plan be available on the mar-
ketplace that excludes abortion coverage, but today twenty-six states 
have banned all plans participating in the state exchanges from cov-
ering abortions and six states do not formally ban coverage although 
no plans currently offer coverage.214 
 Whole Woman’s Health suggests that there is an outer boundary 
in restrictive measures, but it certainly will not halt such efforts en-
tirely. In fact, it may provide a roadmap of how to enact restrictive 
measures under the guise of women’s health.215 On the state level, 
the drumbeat of restrictive measures had increased in pace and vol-
ume to a deafening level leading up to Whole Woman’s Health.216 
These restrictive measures are distinctly stigmatizing and demoniz-
ing.217 They create a framework of “abortion exceptionalism.”218 
                                                                                                                                 
Kaiser report, Texas has since become the twenty-sixth state to ban plans participating in 
the state exchange from offering abortion coverage See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 1696.002. 
 214. See sources cited supra note 213. (leaving seventeen states and the District of 
Columbia to not ban coverage and include at least one plan with coverage and two states in 
which there is no ban and all plans offer coverage). 
 215. See, e.g., Ryland Barton, Ky. Lawmaker Still Wants Abortion Restrictions After 
SCOTUS Ruling, 89.3 WFPL (June 27, 2016), http://wfpl.org/supreme-court-abortion-
ruling-lawmaker/ [https://perma.cc/AM36-VWCL].  
 216. This increase followed the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) decision. “The framework these Justices crafted allowed states 
more latitude to restrict abortion in the interest of protecting potential life, but only as long 
as women could make the ultimate decision whether to continue a pregnancy.” Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” 
Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1431 (2016); see, e.g., S. 152, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016) (amending the state’s informed consent law to require a physician 
consultation by video or in person twenty-hour hours before pregnancy termination); S. 
1552, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2016) (subjecting medical practitioners to loss of licensure 
for abortion, deeming the procedure “unprofessional conduct”); H.R. 2568, 82nd Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (banning abortion after twenty weeks in the Pain Capable Unborn 
Child Protection Act; H.R. 1411, 118th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016) (precluding abortion 
providers from receiving Medicaid funding); Amber Phillips, 14 States Have Passed Laws 
This Year Making It Harder to Get an Abortion, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/01/14-states-have-passed-
laws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-already-this-year/?utm_term=.d0f235d52020 
[https://perma.cc/GM3R-ZHBT] (summarizing that nine states sought to ban all or most 
abortions (although none were enacted), three states banned a common method of second-
trimester abortions, two states lengthened the waiting period, two states enacted twenty 
week bans, and Indiana made it illegal to abort a fetus with Down Syndrome or because of 
race or gender).  
 217. For example, in the final hours of the 2016 legislative session, Alabama passed a 
law which likened abortion clinics to sex offenders by imposing the same restriction that 
they cannot be within 2,000 feet of a public K-8 school. This may require two of the state’s 
five clinics to close or move. See, e.g., Hannah Levintova, Alabama Passes a Bill to Regu-
late Abortion Clinics Like Sex Offenders, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/05/alabama-just-passed-bill-regulate-abortion-
clinics-sex-offenders [https://perma.cc/59ZM-5D34]. Indiana House Resolution 1137 was 
perhaps one of the most notable of the 2016 legislative session on this front. See H.R. 
1337 § 11(b), 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016); H.R. 1337 § 22(9)(a), 119th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016). This law states that a “health care facility hav-
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These laws target abortion for “burdensome, health-justified re-
strictions not imposed on other medical procedures of similar 
risk.”219 These laws regulate the licensing of clinics, the qualifica-
tions of doctors, reporting requirements, informed consent rules, and 
pharmaceutical limitations.220 In 2011 alone, for example, 92 restric-
tive abortion measures passed in state legislatures, reflecting a 
three-fold increase since 2005.221 Then, in just the first half of 2012, 
another 39 restrictive laws were passed at the state level.222 By 
2015, “57% of women live[d] in states considered to be ‘hostile’ or ‘ex-
tremely hostile’ to reproductive rights.”223  
 The impact of all of these restrictive measures is very real for 
women’s access to reproductive care. The impact is logistical, geo-
graphical, financial, and psychological.224 This geographic hardship 
was particularly poignant following Texas House Bill 2.225  
 These restrictive measures are particularly challenging for low-
income women who face a “three-front war in reproductive 
health.”226 Low-income women have fewer resources for contracep-
tion to avoid unintended pregnancies, they are less likely to have 
abortion coverage because Medicaid “almost never” provides cov-
                                                                                                                                 
ing possession of a miscarried fetus shall provide for the final disposition of the miscar-
ried fetus” and creates criminal, civil, and licensing accountability for “knowingly or inten-
tionally perform[ing] an abortion in violation” of these requirements. IND. CODE  
§§ 16-25-4.5(3), 16-34-4(9)(a)-(b) (2016).  
 218. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 216, at 1447. 
 219. Id. at 1430.  
 220. Id. 
 221. Amber Phillips, Three States’ Abortion Laws Just Fell Thanks to the 
Supreme Court. These States Could Be Next., WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/how-many-states-could-see-their- 
abortion-restrictions-struck-down-after-the-supreme-courts-big-ruling/?utm_term=.c5902760c06f. 
 222. Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Democracy, and the “War on Women,” 32 
LAW & INEQ. 1, 8 (2014). 
 223. Christina Cherel, Holding the Line: Challenges to Reproductive Rights in 2016, 
NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nwhn.org/holding-the-line-
challenges-to-reproductive-rights-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/WW9D-3VPW] (noting that 
thirteen states were considered hostile in 2000). 
 224. Caitlin Gerdts et al., Impact of Clinic Closures on Women Obtaining Abortion 
Services After Implementation of a Restrictive Law in Texas, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 857, 
857 (2016) (finding that overall 36% of women whose nearest clinic had closed said the 
burdens associated with obtaining the service was difficult, while only 18% of women said 
the same when their nearest clinic had not closed, reflecting a 50% increase). 
 225. After the Texas legislature passed House Bill 2, the average one-way distance to 
find an abortion provider increased from 22 miles to 85 miles. Id. at 861. Twenty-five 
percent of Texas women would have to travel a distance of 139 miles one-way, and 10% of 
Texas women would have to travel a distance of 256 miles one-way. Id. Even Whole 
Woman’s Health alone only challenged the most restrictive components of the Texas 
abortion regulations. 
 226. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1380.  
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erage, and they are less likely to find a doctor because few doctors 
even participate in Medicaid.227 
 Many of the legislative attacks in 2015 and 2016 focused particu-
larly on defunding and delegitimizing Planned Parenthood. In 2015, 
Congress actively sought to defund Planned Parenthood.228 Defund 
Planned Parenthood legislation passed in states such as Ohio, Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North Caroli-
na, Texas, and Utah—thereby restricting the flow of state funds to 
Planned Parenthood.229  
 For the reproductive rights movement, preserving the status quo 
was the “Alamo” in Whole Woman’s Health. Whether it can be used 
meaningfully to improve the legal status of women’s health or access 
to reproductive care as compared to stopping the enablement and 
empowerment of more unfounded restrictions being enacted at the 
state level remains to be seen.230 Whole Woman’s Health takes a crit-
ical step forward, but it does not speak to why this decision is so im-
portant for women, how women make the decision, and the centrality 
of the decision to women’s overall political and social equality. Ra-
ther, it speaks almost exclusively to the actions and methodologies of 
legislatures. The overall trajectory of the social, political, and legal 
                                                                                                                                 
 227. Id. In comparison, in England and Wales, for example, 98% of all abortions in 2015 
were publicly funded. See U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND  
WALES: 2015 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/529344/Abortion_Statistics_2015_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9KF-PXRA].  
 228. Defund Planned Parenthood Act of 2015, H.R. 3134, 114th Cong. § 2(3) (2015) 
(“All funds that are no longer available to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. 
and its affiliates and clinics pursuant to this Act will continue to be made available to other 
eligible entities to provide women’s health care services.”).  
 229. Leah Jessen, Since the Release of Undercover Videos, 8 States Have Defunded 
Planned Parenthood. Ohio Makes It 9., DAILY SIGNAL (Feb. 12, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/ 
2016/02/12/since-the-release-of-undercover-videos-8-states-have-defunded-planned-parenthood- 
ohio-makes-it-9/ [https://perma.cc/GMH3-ZEFD]; see, e.g., S.B. 44, 1st Spec. Sess. § 1(a) 
(Ala. 2015) (“No person, entity, or association shall offer money or anything of value for an 
aborted fetus or any portion of an aborted fetus; nor shall any person, entity, or association 
accept any money or anything of value for an aborted fetus or any portion of an aborted 
fetus.”); S.B. 569, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (Ark. 2015) (“[P]ublic dollars made 
available . . . through the State . . . may be awarded to an entity that performs elective 
abortions or subsidizes or otherwise facilitates the entity’s ability to perform elective abor-
tions although the funds were not disbursed specifically for the purpose of performing elec-
tive abortions . . . .”); S.B. 214, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016) (“ensur[ing] that 
state funds and certain federal funds are not used either to perform or promote nonthera-
peutic abortions, or to contract or affiliate with any entity that performs or promotes non-
therapeutic abortions”). Some of these statutes may be appealed. 
 230. Molly Redden, Planned Parenthood: Eight States Now Striving to Repeal Abortion 
Restrictions, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/ 
30/planned-parenthood-state-repeal-abortion-restrictions [https://perma.cc/Y3JH-8M6V] 
(“Lawmakers are formulating specific plans to target similar abortion restrictions in Arizona, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, and they are broadly prepared to repeal laws in Florida, Michigan 
and Texas.”). Other anticipated challenges are in Tennessee and Missouri.  
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framing of reproductive decision-making remains perilous and mar-
ginalized.231 Thus, crossing longstanding boundaries may be neces-
sary to move the movement forward.  
B.   Pragmatic Realities 
 Acknowledging the risks of crossing these longstanding boundaries, 
the costs of retaining the boundaries are also worthy of discussion.232 
Existing critiques have explained how the language of choice provided 
a powerful rationale for states to not fund abortion healthcare.233  
 The boundaries that are well drawn in the reproductive rights de-
bate are not pragmatic either. “Pro-life” advocates frame their argu-
ments around the language of personhood, children, parenthood, and 
life.234 “Pro-choice” advocates frame their arguments around choice, 
autonomy, health, decision-making, and women’s rights.235 They con-
sciously avoid the parent / child framing for political and strategic 
reasons.236 These boundaries are black and white; the “third rail” of 
                                                                                                                                 
 231. See, e.g., Susan Decker, Donald Trump Intent on Overturning Supreme Court 
Abortion Ruling, DALL. NEWS (Nov. 2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/ 
2016/11/13/donald-trump-intent-overturning-supreme-court-abortion-ruling.  
 232. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 26, at 1584 (“[C]urrent abortion rights rhetoric carries 
significant costs. The need to reassess that rhetoric seems particularly pressing today.”). 
 233. See, e.g., CONDIT, supra note 10, at 201; Lindgren, supra note 39, at 414 (“By 
severing both private and state health insurance funds for abortion, these laws isolate 
abortion as fundamentally different in kind from healthcare and a luxury that must be 
paid for from private funds.”). 
 234. See, e.g., National Right to Life Mission Statement, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, 
http://www.nrlc.org/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/M8EE-QRVR] (“The mission of National 
Right to Life is to protect and defend the most fundamental right of humankind, the right to 
life of every innocent human being from the beginning of life to natural death.”). 
 235. See, e.g., Our Mission, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://prochoice.org/about-naf/ 
[https://perma.cc/QG6W-93RQ] (“The mission of the National Abortion Federation is to 
ensure safe, legal, and accessible abortion care, which promotes health and justice for 
women.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 236. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Reply, Burying Best Interests of the Resulting Child: A Re-
sponse to Professors Crawford, Alvaré, and Mutcherson, 97 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 10 
(2012) (noting that there is sensitivity to language of “resulting children” when discussing re-
productive decision-making and that this language may be “misused by . . . political opponents,” 
but concluding that “[s]ometimes we must press forward in an intellectually honest way even if 
our arguments will be co-opted by those we disagree with”); How Do I Know If I’m Having a 
Miscarriage?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/pregnancy/ 
miscarriage/how-do-i-know-if-im-having-miscarriage [https://perma.cc/EXZ3-HFNN] (explaining 
that miscarriage may cause a “mix of emotions, including disappointment, despair, shock, guilt, 
grief, and relief” and that this range of emotions is normal). “Take care of yourself physically and 
emotionally, and give yourself permission to grieve your loss if you need to. Grief and sadness 
are very normal responses to miscarriage.” Id.; see also Miscarriage and Fetal Anomaly Support, 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://patients.pposbc.org/miscarriage-support/ (last visited Sept. 5, 
2016) (“Many families have found creating tangible memories to be helpful and comforting as 
they grieve the loss of their pregnancy. Rituals and keepsakes that speak to your personal expe-
rience can help bring about closure for those who wish to say goodbye. Below we have included a 
handful of ideas that other families have used to honor the pregnancy.”). 
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advocacy.237 Crossing those boundaries, even an inch, is considered to 
concede too much on either side of the debate.238 
 The language of “choice” simply does not resonate with all women’s 
experiences, particularly for women terminating for reasons of medical 
necessity.239 The language of “life,” in turn, compromises the under-
standing of women’s health risks in pregnancy and erases the life of 
the pregnant woman from the frame.240 The language of choice pur-
ports to be gender-neutral, allowing all adults to be self-interested, but 
“the ideology of conventional femininity condemns mothers who pur-
sue self-interest over their children’s needs as ‘selfish.’ ”241 These 
boundaries essentialize women’s experiences as decision-makers.242 
 The troublesome way in which the Court’s rhetorical shift to 
“mother” and “unborn child” from “pregnant woman” and “fetus” in 
Gonzales v. Carhart was used exploitatively and emotively is an 
example of the deep dangers associated with any shifts.243 In con-
                                                                                                                                 
 237. The “third rail” refers to a highly charged rail that powers a train and could be 
dangerous, if not lethal, to touch. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Regulation Reproduction: The 
Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 426 (2011) (critiquing the role that the 
BIOC analysis plays in regulating reproductive rights).  
One way of understanding the prominence of [Best Interests of the Resulting 
Children] justifications for the regulation of reproduction, then, is as 
transposition of reasoning from family law into the law of reproduction. The 
analogy goes: protecting the best interests of existing children is to the 
constitutional protections against interference in child rearing and legal 
parenthood (family autonomy) as protecting the best interests of resulting 
children is to the constitutional protections against interference in reproductive 
decisions (reproductive autonomy). 
Id. at 435. Cohen carves out the “abortion right” as requiring a different analysis. Id. at 441. 
 238. See Lindgren, supra note 39, at 388 (explaining how “the Court’s current analysis 
leaves access to abortion vulnerable to erosion by courts and legislatures” and the decision 
between “healthcare and choice [has] become a zero-sum trade-off”). 
 239. See, e.g., Jeannie Ludlow, Love and Goodness: Toward a New Abortion Politics, 38 
FEMINIST STUD. 474, 476 (2012) (explaining that rights and legislation seem removed from 
her experience in that moment); Williams, supra note 26, at 1584 (“Yet choice rhetoric is 
not the simple, unadulterated truth of women’s lives: many aborting women feel they have 
no choice but to abort. The rhetoric has been strategic from the beginning, not expressive of 
pristine, unchanging truths.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 240. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1361 (prohibiting access to abortion thus can threaten 
the life of pregnant women too).  
 241. Williams, supra note 26, at 1561.  
 242. See, e.g., MCDONNELL, supra note 3, at 23 (“[W]omen’s experience of abortion is not 
being addressed and integrated into the way we talk politically about the issue. . . . [H]aving 
an abortion is not the straightforward exercise it sometimes appears to be in our leaflets  
and slogans.”).  
 243. To consider examples of the concerns that reproductive rights advocates had with 
the rhetorical shifts in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), see generally Maya 
Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 282 (2009) (concluding that abortion law treats competent 
adult women as incompetent “to make decisions about their own healthcare”); Lindgren, 
supra note 39, at 413. To consider how advocates for restricting abortion understood the 
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trast, Roe v. Wade, for example, described the interests of pregnant 
women and potential prenatal life.244  
 Parental rights and reproductive rights are also pragmatically in-
terconnected because the exercise of a woman’s right to decide to 
terminate a pregnancy is most notably an exercise of her decision on 
whether to be a parent at that point in her life.245 She is deciding 
whether to forego parenting, defer parenting to a later point, or be-
come a parent now. It is only logical that in making this decision she 
would be analyzing what the state expects of her in terms of how she 
would parent and the relationship that she would (should) have with 
her child, a point which is explored further below. To the extent that 
the state will apply parenting standards that the pregnant woman 
does not believe she is able to meet, that is a critical way in which 
parental decision-making is deeply relevant to abortion decision-
making. If the state expects her to act always in her children’s  
best interests and will judge her unfit otherwise, that is a critical,  
pragmatic intersection.  
 The state also holds tremendous power over both types of decision-
making, as compared to other types of decision-making (for example, 
healthcare, employment, or financial). While states certainly regulate 
healthcare, employment, and finances, the power of the state to ter-
minate parental relationships or to implicitly compel one to 
parenthood is a distinctly unique power. The BIOC standard is often 
understood as a considerable “trump” to supersede parental authori-
ty. The state, for example, plays a parens patriae role to protect chil-
dren in certain contexts.246 It is defined as a “sovereign right and du-
ty [of the state] to care for a child and protect him from neglect, 
abuse and fraud during his minority.”247 Roe likewise espoused a 
state’s interest in acting on behalf of “protecting prenatal life.”248 As 
discussed above, the state intervenes in innumerable ways to regu-
late and restrict the abortion decision-making of women. Thus, both 
types of state action are to override individual decision-making.  
                                                                                                                                 
case and its rhetorical shifts, see Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion 
Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 411 (2008) (arguing that 
Gonzales “created abortion law that looks and feels like family law”).  
 244. 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).  
 245. See generally Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the 
Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 329 (2010) (positioning abortion 
as a range of reproductive rights, rather than an isolated right to put reproductive rights 
on “firmer footing”).  
 246. Cahn, supra note 126, at 109, 112.  
 247. Carbone, supra note 59, at S115. This state role has “been more presumed than 
explored” and the “parameters of that role, are somewhat obscure.” Cahn, supra note 126, 
at 109, 112 (noting, however, that it has been explored more in the foster care system). 
 248. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (noting that “some phrase it in terms of duty”).  
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 It is unrealistic to think that the state builds boundaries and 
walls around its power to intervene on behalf of children and its pow-
er to intervene on behalf of potential life.249 It is also unrealistic to 
think that women universally build and retain these boundaries.250 
The contours of the state’s power to trump parental decision-making 
is deeply connected comparatively to understanding the scope of the 
state’s power in regulating women’s abortion decision-making.251  
C.   Doctrinal Connections 
 A unified approach also aligns with the doctrinal framings of the 
right to privacy governing women’s abortion decision-making. Nota-
bly, the trajectory of the rights for parents remains much more stable 
and protected than reproductive rights. Parents play a primary role 
raising their children and that right is constitutionally protected,252 
but it is not absolute.253 Parents in intact families are presumed to 
act in the children’s best interests, and their child-rearing decisions 
receive “special weight.”254 This is a unique aspect of constitutional 
law and family law and one that merits strategic consideration in the 
modern and perilous reproductive rights advocacy conversation. 
 The roots of the right to privacy include critical strands of paren-
tal decision-making. The right to privacy that prohibits the state 
from improperly infringing on a woman’s right to decide whether to 
bear or beget a child as articulated in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, 
relied heavily on the parental decision-making cases of Meyer and 
Pierce. In a pair of Lochner-era cases, the United States Supreme 
Court first held that parents hold a fundamental right to direct the 
upbringing of their children. First, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Su-
preme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
                                                                                                                                 
 249. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 126, at 132 (“The state’s claim that it can represent 
children’s interests plays a significant role in defining the structure of families, the rela-
tionships within families, and the development of children’s interests.”).  
 250. MCDONNELL, supra note 3, at 80 (“We can no longer talk about ‘choice’ in a 
vacuum. We must talk about the right to have as well as not have children.”).  
 251. Carbone, supra note 59, at S113. 
 252. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“This primary role of the parents in 
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.”). The Supreme Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska that the liberty clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “[w]ithout doubt” included “the right of the individual to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children.” 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
 253. See, e.g., Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he State 
may limit parental rights in a number of ways, including prohibiting the abuse or neglect 
of children, regulating child labor, requiring children to be vaccinated, requiring school 
attendance, and requiring that children be restrained while riding in motor vehicles.”).  
 254. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58-59 (2000) (striking down a statute allowing 
any person at any time to petition for visitation of the biological mother’s children).  
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States Constitution provides “freedom from bodily restraint” as well 
as the freedom to marry, “establish a home and bring up children.”255 
The Court held that the state had improperly infringed on these lib-
erties when it prohibited the teaching of foreign language to certain 
children in schools.256 It concluded that “[w]ithout doubt, [the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes . . . the right 
of the individual to . . . bring up children . . . [and] to enjoy those priv-
ileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men.”257  
 In 1925, the Supreme Court reaffirmed these protections in Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, holding that “[t]he child is not the mere creature 
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for ad-
ditional obligations.”258 Meyer and Pierce, however, had doctrinal limi-
tations in their longevity because they were also very much about the 
contractual and property rights of the teachers to earn a living, and 
the Court was striking down laws with strong nativist implications. In 
time, however, the rights of parents to the custody, care, and control of 
their children set out in Meyer and Pierce were reaffirmed in later de-
cisions that were free from the critiques of Lochner-era cases.259  
 Griswold v. Connecticut is the doctrinal bridge that first connected 
the parental decision-making cases to reproductive decision-making 
under a unified lens of family. In Griswold, the Court struck down a 
Connecticut statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives. It 
cited the above cases outlining the rights of parents to make deci-
sions related to the care, custody, and rearing of their children.260 Le-
gally, however, the reproductive rights arguments were channeled 
into a right-to-privacy frame following Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe 
                                                                                                                                 
 255. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 256. Id. at 400 (concluding that the statute was arbitrary and “without reasonable 
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect”). 
 257. Id. at 399 (defining the right as a fundamental liberty interest). 
 258. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (upholding a preliminary 
injunction enjoining enforcement of a compulsory education law). The Oregon statute at issue 
required parents and guardians with control or custody of children between the ages of eight 
and sixteen to send the children to public school or face misdemeanor penalties. Id. at 510.  
 259. In 1944, for example, the Court held that “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, 
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can neither supply nor hinder.” 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held 
that “the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their 
children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.” 406 U.S. 205, 
213-14 (1972). It held that the strong tradition of parental concern for the nurturing and 
“upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate.” Id. at 232.  
 260. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (“Without those 
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the principle 
of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.”).  
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v. Ullman.261 The right to privacy, critically, protected the marital 
couple from government intrusion into procreative decision-
making.262 Eisenstadt then expanded that right to individuals based 
on an equal protection challenge. It held that “[i]f the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”263  
 Roe v. Wade affirmed the shared doctrinal roots of abortion deci-
sion-making with parental decision-making. When the Court in Roe 
considered the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, the 
Court held: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, 
in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.264  
 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
the Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe. It did so in a way 
that also reaffirmed the interconnectedness of abortion decision-
making and family decision-making as well. The plurality tethered 
the right to terminate a pregnancy to broader concepts of autonomy 
and dignity when it stated, “These matters, involving the most inti-
mate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”265  
                                                                                                                                 
 261. 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (striking down a challenge to the same Connecticut law 
challenged in Griswold, but concluding that that the plaintiffs did not have standing to 
challenge the law). Justice Harlan’s dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process clause was broad enough to include the liberty interests violated here. Id. at 
523 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This approach is limited because it “cannot accommodate 
the fact that many people rely on government support for their daily activities, whether 
they be education (e.g., student loans), family formation (e.g., tax credits), or 
employment.” Luna & Luker, supra note 6, at 329. 
 262. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. Justice Douglas, writing for the Griswold majority, 
positioned the right to privacy within the “penumbras” and “emanations” of other 
constitutional rights. Id. at 484. Concurring opinions placed the right to privacy in the 
Ninth Amendment to the Constitution (Justice Goldberg) and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (Justice Harlan). See id. at 486-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 
499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 263. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down the statute on equal 
protection grounds).  
 264. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  
 265. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). The decision 
positions a pregnant woman with decision-making autonomy, but also considerably em-
powered the state to persuade and “inform” that decision. The opinion expressed a “pro-
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 The bridge between parental decision-making and reproductive 
decision-making was reaffirmed in Troxel v. Granville, but Troxel 
also showed the enduring protections given to parental rights. In 
2000, the Supreme Court, citing the previous lineage of cases, held in 
Troxel that the liberty interests of parents and guardians protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “includes 
the right ‘to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control.’ ”266 It held that for fit parents “there will normally be 
no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best 
decisions concerning the rearing of the parent’s children.”267 The 
Court thus reaffirmed the positioning of parental decision-making as 
a constitutionally protected right that is doctrinally aligned in the 
source of the right (the right to privacy) with the decision to termi-
nate a pregnancy.268 As Jill Hasday concludes in Family Law Reimag-
ined, “change in family law’s treatment of the parent-child relation-
ship has not been nearly as dramatic or far-reaching as stories about 
the modern preeminence of children’s interests might suggest.”269 Ra-
ther, parental rights are protected in many contexts, including the 
constitutional protections noted above.270 
 Notably, as uncomfortable as it might be for the reproductive 
rights movement to acknowledge, this positions the constitutional 
jurisprudence of abortion as doctrinally tethered closer to parental 
rights (and thus, to family law) than it is to women’s constitutional 
equality. That was never the feminist plan, but it is the current reali-
ty. Women’s reproductive decision-making remains untethered ex-
plicitly from equal protection arguments—a point many feminist 
                                                                                                                                 
found interest in potential life” that supported the enactment of state laws throughout a 
woman’s pregnancy. Id. at 878. The “means chosen by the State to further the interest in 
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it” and the 
state cannot impose an “undue burden” on the woman’s decision. Id. at 877. An undue bur-
den is a “state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id. Whole Woman’s 
Health clarified that an undue burden requires the state to consider the burdens a law 
imposes on women, but also the benefits that it offers to women; laws that are not medical-
ly justified will not stand. 
 266. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925)). 
 267. Id. at 68-69. 
 268. This doctrinal framing might be surprising to some. Notably missing is legal anal-
ysis of reproductive rights as women’s rights. The doctrinal underpinnings of reproductive 
rights align more closely with the rights of parents than they do with the rights of woman 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  
 269. See HASDAY, supra note 43, at 135. 
 270. See id.  
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scholars have critiqued for decades.271 Women were protected from 
some aspects of government regulation, but the basis for this protec-
tion was not about women making autonomous decisions or achieving 
equal political status.272 Rather, the right was about freedom from 
government intrusion into private matters.  
 The absence of the parallel equal protection frame became partic-
ularly noteworthy after Obergefell v. Hodges and United States v. 
Windsor.273 These cases struck down state bans on same-sex mar-
riage and federal bans on the recognition of valid same-sex marriag-
es, respectively, using a “helix” of both the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.274 Reproductive 
rights, critically, only hold one strand of the helix in current consti-
tutional doctrine. 
D.   The Intersection of Family Law and Reproductive Rights  
 The polarization described above leaves abortion decision-making 
in a tenuous and untethered place in the field of family law. A simple 
web search for “reproductive rights” yields no references to families 
whatsoever without extensive and prolonged digging. The key results 
focus on, for example, nonprofit groups working on reproductive 
rights, news about state legislative activity, historical chronologies of 
the movement. The notion of “family” is simply missing from social, 
legal, and political framings of abortion. Interestingly, it is largely 
missing from both the “choice” and the “life” sides of the debate. In 
contrast, simple web searches for “family law” yield innumerable 
links to law practitioners, resources and tools to work through family 
law issues, and pages for local bar sections. The social, political, and 
legal framing of family law is likewise missing conception, reproduc-
tion, and abortion. 
 Scholars and casebook authors typically consider reproductive 
rights as a subset of family law, but primarily in the area of constitu-
tional law. Most family law casebooks use a constitutional lens to set 
the outer boundaries of how far the state can go in regulating the 
                                                                                                                                 
 271. See Bachiochi, supra note 107, at 889 n.3 for a list of sources arguing that the 
abortion right should be based in equal protection. For a chronology of equal protection 
cases and scholarly debate about the Equal Protection Clause argument’s role in abortion, 
see id. at 898-907. 
 272. Huberfeld, supra note 9, at 1372 (“[W]omen qua women are absent from the 
Court’s analyses.”). 
 273. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (striking down state bans on same-
sex marriage); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down provisions 
of the Defense of Marriage Act).  
 274. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. 
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family.275 The right to access contraception and the right to terminate 
a pregnancy are presented, but they are presented as an outer 
boundary to state power—set distinctly apart from the decision-
making roles of parents and the BIOC standard.276 This leaves the 
impression that reproductive rights abstractly are a chapter of family 
law, but that they do not bear a connection to the way we think about 
parenting and family decision-making more broadly.  
 Reproductive rights scholarship also has a tenuous relationship to 
family law scholarship. While family law conferences will accept pa-
pers about reproductive rights, they are generally segmented off as a 
subset of the field. Law conferences routinely bifurcate papers on re-
productive rights from those on parenting, custody, or visitation. 
There are separate blogs, separate casebooks,277 separate courses, 
and separate fields of scholarship. A unified framing of reproductive 
and parental decision-making would also more cohesively position 
reproductive rights as a field that is interconnected with family law.  
V.   CONCLUSION  
 Conventional approaches have positioned reproductive rights as 
distinct from parental rights. Any alignment is something that the 
reproductive rights movement has historically resisted squarely.278 It 
has resisted this alignment for fear that it compels the personhood of 
the fetus or the parental status of the woman decision-maker. This 
hardline approach may be too cautious or too all-encompassing. 
There may be critical gains to using a unified approach to under-
standing the decision-making methodologies of parents and women 
making reproductive decisions. To deny this alignment with parental 
decision-making entirely is also to compromise the identities of other 
                                                                                                                                 
 275. See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (6th ed. 2016). Chapter 1 describes the constitutional protections 
for the family and its members. Id. The content on reproduction is there to frame the power 
of the state. It is not connected to parenting per se or to the decision to become a parent. It 
is about state power.  
 276. Compare DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 2012), 
and IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2010) 
(beginning the respective texts with a chapter on marriage, family, and privacy and ending 
with content on ART and adoption), with HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, 
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2013) (embedding chapters on “Becoming a Parent: 
Contraception, Abortion, and Paternity,” “Adoption,” “Assisted Reproduction,” and “Child, 
Parent, and State: Rights and Obligations” in the heart of the doctrinal material).  
 277. A pioneering textbook on reproductive rights was published in 2015. See MELISSA 
MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (2015). This 
book signals the importance of the field of reproductive rights.  
 278. See supra Section II.A.  
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decision-makers who do think in these terms.279 It allows oppositional 
groups to demonize, marginalize, and distance the decision-making of 
women over their reproduction from the ordinary decision-making of 
others. It compromises empathy. It fosters isolation and loneliness.280 
 Expanding our understandings of abortion decision-making to in-
clude autono(thee) and autono(we) results in a more inclusive femi-
nist account of abortion decision-making.281 It builds on liberal no-
tions of autonomy, but also builds in space for other framings. Femi-
nists have historically been “wary of reliance on liberal notions of in-
dividualistic choice to promote autonomy and equality.”282 Feminists 
have critiqued liberal autonomy as marginalizing “interdependence 
and care,”283 instead emphasizing how liberal politics must be “sensi-
tive to relations of care, interdependence, and mutual support that 
define our lives and which have traditionally marked the realm of the 
feminine.”284 Some feminist strands instead emphasize a relational 
autonomy model that “optimiz[es] autonomous decision making 
through dialogue and explicit recognition of social and contextual 
pressures involved in choice.”285 This approach acknowledges that 
autonomy occurs “within and because of relationships.”286 This is a 
more dynamic concept of autonomy in which one’s autonomy is actu-
alized in the context of relationships and others.287 
                                                                                                                                 
 279. See, e.g., Ludlow, supra note 239, at 476 (explaining that the language of 
“autonomy and choice” does not resonate with “many women” who have had abortions 
because their lives are complex and they are focusing on their families and their lives). 
 280. This is a point which reproductive rights groups, such as the Abortion Care 
Network, have tried to counter with publicity campaigns and supportive materials 
emphasizing “[y]ou are a good woman” or that “[g]ood women have abortions.” Id. at 478-79 
(noting as well that there might be a normative critique to feminists being concerned with 
“good women”). 
 281. See generally Smith, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that Justice Kennedy does 
not understand or relate to abortion decision-making and that he “imagines [it] as a 
process that results in the loss of maternal bliss”). Smith argues that there is a significant 
lack of information about the process of abortion decision-making, which fuels 
misinformation and beliefs that the decisions are “irrational and selfish.” Id.  
 282. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 163, at 608; Williams, supra note 26, at 1561 
(“A more accurate understanding of liberalism would recognize the way it excludes mothers 
from the republic of self-interested choice, mandating selflessness for mothers and self-
interest for others.”). 
 283. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 163, at 608, 610 (‘ “Relational autonomy’ provides an 
alternative understanding of autonomy that acknowledges the many social and contextual 
constraints and pressures that may be placed on choices while simultaneously recognizing 
that there is value in self-determination.”). 
 284. John Christman, Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social 
Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL. STUD. 143, 143 (2004).  
 285. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 163, at 611 (noting that relational autonomy focuses on 
the “contextual forces that shape a decision beyond explicit coercion”). 
 286. Carolyn Ells et al., Relational Autonomy as an Essential Component of Patient-
Centered Care, 4 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 79, 86 (2011).  
 287. Id. 
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 It is dangerous and marginalizing to leave reproductive rights 
dangling perilously as an offshoot of constitutional law and a 
bookend of family law. Rather, it is time to embrace the doctrinal in-
terconnections that reproductive decision-making has to parental de-
cision-making. This is in no way to displace the critical work that 
rights and autonomy framings also add to our understandings of re-
productive rights, but to add depth and context to the origins of the 
right and the realities of decision-making. This approach—while ad-
mittedly breaching longstanding boundaries—seeks to ultimately 
build bridges, understanding, and inclusiveness to the reproductive 
rights movement.288 
 Positioning abortion decision-making in a unified frame with pa-
rental decision-making would powerfully debunk troublesome and 
demonizing myths about why women terminate pregnancies. Reduc-
ing cultural stigma is a critical goal of the reproductive rights move-
ment. Despite the data discussed above revealing that the typical 
woman who terminates her pregnancy is already a mother, few peo-
ple recognize or internalize these accounts.289 These misperceptions 
come squarely from the challenges people perceive in reconciling par-
enting and abortion.290 It is hard to “demonize politically” mothers 
who are making such tough choices about “low income, unemploy-
ment, and a lack of health insurance, or [who] are struggling to raise 
kids on their own.”291 It would also destigmatize certain aspects of 
abortion decision-making because it would soften the perceived dis-
sonance of women choosing not to become parents.292 
 This unified framing also challenges the monopoly on morality 
that the pro-life movement currently holds. It suggests that an indi-
vidual’s perception of morality or religion is also a way of actualizing 
one’s autono(me). This framing brings the strong religious lens and 
the strong women’s autonomy lenses closer together. A religious ob-
jection to abortion can be an autono(me) decision just as a woman’s 
decision to terminate can be an autono(thee) decision. 
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 While abortion decision-making is understood as a highly politicized 
and polarizing framework, a unified framework would reveal that par-
enting decision-making is likewise political.293 The cultural script that 
we write for parents is deeply entrenched in cultural, social, and moral 
expectations.294 This script, as many feminist authors have revealed, is 
not gender-neutral in the expectations it places on parents.295 When 
parents, particularly mothers, do not align with this cultural script, it 
can silence and isolate parents.296 That script is also heavily grounded in 
middle-class privilege, in which what “children are and need patently 
reflect a white, middle-class cultural hegemony.”297 
 This approach might also build new allies or empathizers. When 
abortion decision-making is reframed as a contextual and relational 
decision, might someone who experienced a divorce or a separation be 
able to better understand the complex, contextual decision-making 
that women undergo in relation to their pregnancies?298 Might a par-
ent who has decided not to vaccinate their children or to homeschool 
their children empathize with the demonization and judgment that is 
cast upon those women who elect to terminate their pregnancies? 
These tethers might cross critical political and legal boundaries at 
least to create understanding. 
 It is time to reconsider the longstanding boundaries. There may be 
critical ground to be gained in exploring the complex, multi-
dimensional realities of decision-making.  
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